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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction    
My primary research focus is on United States-Libya relations during the 2001-
2011 timeframe and the impetus of the U.S. role in the 2011 intervention in the Libyan 
conflict.  In other words, why did Libya become a target for U.S. military intervention 
during the Arab Spring, which resulted in the downfall of Mu’ammar Qadhaffi’s Regime, 
a U.S. ally since the post-9/11 era.  This project gives particular attention to the impact of 
both 9/11 and the Arab Spring on U.S.-Libya relations since they embody significant 
turning points of contemporary U.S.-Libya affairs.  In this study, I argue that the U.S. 
involvement in the international intervention in Libya was “over-determined,” or having 
more than one determining factor, since both a humanitarian and strategic interest in 
backing the intervention existed.  Additional research questions are if diplomatic and 
economic ties were normalized in 2006, why did the U.S. favor the Libyan rebels against 
the Libyan government? and what incentives led to the normalization of U.S.-Libya 
relations? 
Over the past three decades, diplomatic relations between Libya and the U.S. have 
fluctuated dramatically between co-optation and active confrontation.  The low point of 
U.S.-Libya relations, in the 1980s saw the severing of diplomatic relations between the 
two states under the Reagan Administration and Libya’s corresponding international 
isolation.  Libya subsequently endured various political and economic sanctions imposed 
by both the U.S. and the United Nations (U.N.) for two decades (1992-2004).  This 
dynamic changed in the post-September 11
th
, 2001 (9/11) period when the two countries 
saw a rapprochement.  Libya became an ally on the ‘war on terror,’ ended its nuclear 
 6 
weapons program and ultimately restored its diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 2006.  
Five years later, in March of 2011, U.S.-Libya relations once again turned confrontational 
as the Libyan government’s violent response to domestic protests during the Arab Spring 
provided pretext for an international military intervention. 
As the events of the Arab Spring unfolded in Libya in February 2011, the Libyan 
government’s forces met protestors with extreme vigor.  The escalating violence in Libya 
prompted fear in the international community regarding a potential genocide in the main 
rebel-held city of Benghazi as well as other parts of eastern Libya by government forces.  
France and Britain were the first countries to request an international military 
intervention in Libya.  Subsequently, the U.S. officially became a supporter of military 
action to the civil unrest.  The U.S. became a key player in the intervention despite strong 
internal opposition to military engagement within the Obama Administration.  The 
military intervention began with a U.N. mandated no-fly zone over Libya.  The U.N. 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 authorized further efforts to destabilize the 
Libyan government by not ruling out any means of protecting Libyan civilians.
1
   
The U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
2
 military intervention 
in Libya raised serious questions regarding the true intentions of the participating 
countries.  It has been argued that Libya’s large oil reserves and natural gas deposits were 
the real incentives behind the UNSCR 1973.  Moreover, Libya’s proximity to Western 
Europe enables fast oil delivery to European states.  Therefore, Libya’s strategic location 
                                                        
1
 United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1973) Retrieved April 2011 from http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement  
2
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance that was founded in 
1949 in order to address security concerns in the 21
st
 century.  Its members include 28 countries from 
Western Europe and North America.  
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is another enticement for powerful states to pursue greater political and economic 
influence in Libya.  As a result, some observers insist that the humanitarian argument can 
be easily construed as a false pretense for intervening in Libya. 
Although I argue that the U.S. support for the intervention in Libya was driven by 
both humanitarian concerns and geo-strategic incentives, a more in-depth historical 
examination of U.S.-Libya relations and the internal dynamics of Libya is required in 
order to better understand this fluctuating political relationship.  The historical context 
provides insight on why Libya was an exception for U.S. foreign policy in terms of 
engaging in a military intervention in Libya’s conflict during the Arab Spring.  Since 
Libya is the only country that experienced a direct military intervention in support of the 
government’s opposition during the Arab Spring, this analysis also raises important 
issues regarding the ‘realpolitik’3 incentives associated with the interference and ultimate 
regime change in Libya.  
 While the historical context provides critical information regarding US-Libya 
relations, International Relations paradigms offer important insight on the causes and 
incentives for hostility and reconciliation between the U.S. and Libya as well as on the 
international system in which the two states interact.  Although this thesis focuses on the 
fluctuating US-Libya relations instead of theory, I briefly incorporate the theoretical 
lenses of neorealism, liberal internationalism and neo-Gramscian analysis in order to 
address important themes throughout this study.  Neorealism and liberal internationalism 
offer important insight on the rationale for fluctuating U.S.-Libya relations and the debate 
regarding the U.S. role in the 2011 international intervention in Libya.  An additional 
                                                        
3
 The word ‘realpolitik’ refers to a policy of political realism or practical politics.  Therefore, the term 
describes the politics of the real word rather than politics based on theoretical, moral, or idealistic concerns. 
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paradigm of IR critical theory, neo-Gramscian analysis, offers a critical perspective on 
U.S.-Libya relations, specifically regarding the global hegemon (U.S.) and the structural 
power of the international world order.   
As the reconstruction of Libya progresses in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Qadhaffi regime, it is crucial to understand both the history of U.S.-Libya relations and 
the context of U.S. participation in the intervention in Libya.  The U.S.-Libya relationship 
has not unfolded without the influences of other actors.  Therefore, the international 
community is also critical in the analysis of historical and contemporary U.S.-Libya 
relations.  The power relations between states, transnational alliances and international 
organizations provide a broader understanding of the geopolitical environment in which 
U.S.-Libya relations have evolved and why the international intervention in Libya took 
place.  
 
Methodology 
 This paper approaches issues of U.S.-Libya hostility and diplomacy using 
qualitative research.  This project’s key literature base consists of primary and secondary 
sources.  I reference such primary sources as politicians’ speeches, statements, 
interviews, U.N. Security Council Resolutions, news reports, newspaper articles and 
international non-governmental organization reports.  Secondary sources comprise the 
majority of the literature base and include numerous journal articles and books.  A 
significant portion of this study focuses on the international intervention in Libya.  I 
examine arguments of key U.S. government officials, proponents of and those opposed to 
 9 
the 2011 intervention in Libya, along with arguments from key Libya scholars as well as 
writers, journalists, professionals and policy analysts.   
 
Structure of the Study 
 This study is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter provides an introduction 
to the project and its importance.  It identifies my hypothesis and the research questions 
used to frame the study and support my argument.  It includes chapter summaries that 
indicate the main themes and events studied in each chapter and their significance to my 
hypothesis.   
 The second chapter provides a historical background of Libya and U.S.-Libya 
relations to contextualize contemporary U.S.-Libya affairs and highlight important 
themes.  The political and economic forces that shaped U.S.-Libya relations since Libya’s 
independence in 1951 throughout the Clinton Administration (1993-2001) provide a 
strong foundation in order to grasp the fluctuating nature of U.S.-Libya relations.  This 
chapter emphasizes the changes that occurred in U.S.-Libya relations during the Reagan 
and Clinton Administrations, as they are central to the problematic U.S.-Libya 
relationship.  Also central to this study is a brief investigation of Libya’s infitah4, or 
economic liberalization efforts and the political, economic and social realities facing the 
Libyan government. 
 In addition, chapter two provides an analysis of arguments made by scholars, key 
government officials, journalists and activists regarding U.S. motives for isolating Libya 
as a rogue state.  This chapter discusses Libya’s fundamental political reorientation with 
                                                        
4 An Arabic word meaning “openness”, it was coined by former Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat to 
define his ‘open door’ policy, or restructuring of the Egyptian economy initiated after the 1973 October 
War.  (Ghannan, Farha 1997.) 
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the U.S. and the beginning of the negotiation process initiated by Libya in the 1990s is 
examined along with the impact of Libya’s alleged Lockerbie involvement on U.S.-Libya 
relations. 
 The third chapter investigates how the events of 9/11 provided an opportunity for 
Libya to become a U.S. ally in the ‘war on terror’.  Libya’s support of the U.S. after 9/11 
enabled Libya to fast-track the normalization process with the U.S.  The backdrop of the 
U.S. invasions on Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) are taken into discussion, as they 
influenced relations between the two countries.  Further examined in this chapter are the 
key political negotiations that took place under the George W. Bush Administration: The 
Lockerbie Settlement (2002), Libya’s renunciation of its Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) program (2003) and the official announcement of normalization of relations with 
the U.S. (2006). 
 Chapter four focuses on the 2011 Arab Spring, the Libyan Revolution and the 
subsequent international military intervention.  A brief overview of the economic and 
political underpinnings of the Arab Spring, specifically the Libyan Revolution, provide 
an understanding of the complex political and economic realities of the MENA
5
 region.  
Following this synopsis, the growing opposition to the Qadhaffi Regime is revisited as it 
demonstrates the fragile nature of the Libyan government prior to the Arab Spring.  As a 
result of historical patterns of U.S. interference in the MENA region, this chapter 
questions the motives behind the participation of the U.S. in the international intervention 
in Libya.  U.S.-Libyan relations once again turned confrontational, and resulted in the 
demise of Qadhaffi’s Regime.  This chapter also examines how domestic, international, 
                                                        
5
 The MENA countries include the countries between Morocco and Iran.  The North African countries are 
referred to as Al Mahgreb (the west) and the countries of Egypt to Iran are known as Al-Mashreq (the east).   
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political and economic forces influenced U.S.-Libya relations and how resulting actions 
and policies framed the discourse supporting the U.S. involvement in the intervention. 
  Finally, this chapter probes why Libya is an exception in U.S. foreign policy 
towards the Arab Spring as it juxtaposes its support for other authoritarian governments 
in the MENA region.  The humanitarian argument applied to the international 
intervention makes it critical to examine the incentives of various states and alliances in 
the Libyan intervention; the U.S., Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), who are key NATO AND GCC
6
 members.  These nations and 
the structural powers (transnational alliances and international organizations) they 
represent that influence the world order are essential to this study.  The chapter concludes 
with the post-Qadhaffi violence in Libya and the colonial, social, economic and political 
reasons it ensued.  The violence is addressed in order to illustrate the political and 
economic growing pains of the Libyan nation-state.  The final chapter summarizes the 
study, reiterates my research questions, argument, discusses important theoretical 
paradigms that aid in the analysis of US-Libya relations and concludes with my study’s 
findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6
 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 in order to facilitate policy cohesion 
among its member states.  GCC member states include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, and the Republic of Yemen. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review  
Libya:  State Formation and Historical Context   
 In the first half of the twentieth century, Libya endured myriad foreign invasions 
by Turkey, Italy, Germany, France and Britain.
7
  Like many post-colonial nations of the 
Middle East and Africa, Libya emerged out of the WWI settlement, and was shaped by 
the British and French influence over the disjointed Ottoman Empire.
8
  Libya comprises 
the three formerly distinct regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan; which 
developed separately since the beginnings of recorded history in the Phoenician, 
Ptolemaic, Roman, Meccan and Ottoman eras.
9
  Today, the country remains divided into 
the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan.  These distinct provinces 
have resulted in political, economic, social and religious fragmentation in Libya.   
 Libya’s most violent years were those of the Italian colonial period that began in 
1911, which provoked fierce and unrelenting resistance from the Libyans.  Italy’s 
reconquest of Libya began in 1922 and lasted until the end of World War II.  In 1943, 
Libya came under the military administration of the British (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) 
and the French (Fezzan).  Britain and France ruled fragmented parts of Libya until the 
U.N. declared it an independent nation in 1951 and installed the monarchy of King Idris 
al Senussi. Libyan authorities have stated that the Italians killed approximately 750,000 
Libyans during this time.
10
  Libyans who were not murdered outright were subjected to 
                                                        
7
 Simons, Geoff. 1996. Libya: The Struggle for Survival.  New York: Saint Martin’s Press. p. 141. 
8
 Otman, Waniss & Karlberg, Erling. 2007. The Libyan Economy:  Economic Diversification and 
International Repositioning. Scotland:  Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.  
9
 Ibid. p. 2. 
10
 Simons.  p. 122. 
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concentration camps, torture, racially abused, exploited as forced labor and reduced to 
poverty.
11
 
The failed attempts at state building in Libya by the Ottomans, the Sanusiyya, the 
Tripoli Republic and the Italians resulted in kinship, or tribal, religious and familial 
relationships as a prominent determinant of the political relationships in government.
12
  
Over time, however, Libya’s foreign invaders also contributed to the creation of a multi-
ethnic country.  Both Arab and non-Arab tribes comprise the ethnic makeup of Libyans.  
The non-Arab ethnicities include the Berbers, Tuareg and Tebu and those of Arab-Berber 
mixed blood.  Tribal and regional identities are critical components of Libyan society 
since it is a multi-ethnic state that has relied on kinship for social and economic mobility 
and political access.   
Geoff Simons’ Libya:  The Struggle for Survival (1993) bears an appropriate title 
for an in-depth study of Libya’s history of foreign invasions and its problematic position 
in the world, both before and after independence.  Its dependence on the U.S. and 
Western Europe, particularly Britain, challenged the monarchy’s legitimacy with the 
Libyan people.  As a result of the long history of colonial interferences in Libya, deep 
mistrust of colonial powers is still shared today among the majority of the population of 
Libya and the MENA region.  Regardless of this mistrust, a decade after independence, 
Libya was the poorest nation state in the world
13
 and deeply reliant on Western powers 
for training, weaponry and direct financial aid.
14
   
                                                        
11
 Ibid. p. 141. 
12
 Anderson, Lisa. 1990. ‘Tribe and State:  Libyan Anomalies’ in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle 
East. Edited by Philip S. Khoury & Joseph Kostiner. Berkely and Los Angeles, University of California 
Press. p. 295 
13
 Simons. p. 182. 
14
 Ibid. p. 185 
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From 1945-1991, the Cold War dominated world politics.  Conservative countries 
in the MENA aligned themselves with the U.S. while the revolutionary and nationalist 
states were aligned with the Soviet Union at various stages throughout the Cold War. 
After the discovery of oil in 1957, Libya’s extreme dependence on the U.S. and Britain 
changed.
15
  Throughout the 1960’s, Libya no longer relied on U.S. aid as oil revenues 
increased.
16
  The Monarchy of King Idris received rents for the U.S. military base at 
Wheelus Field and for the British military base at El Aden, but the development of 
Libya’s hydrocarbon industry decreased the reliance on these payments.17  Libya’s 
advantageous geographical position and its proximity to key European and North 
American markets (particularly when compared to other Middle East oil producers) 
greatly aided in the development of its oil economy.
18
  Libya’s geo-strategic importance 
is further examined in Chapters three and four.   
King Idris may have enjoyed close relations with the U.S., but domestic 
dissatisfaction with the Western-backed monarchy led to the bloodless coup d’état in 
September 1969.  It was led by a group of young Libyan military officers led by 
Mu’ammar Al-Qadhaffi, known as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).  
Qadhaffi was a product of the British run Royal Libyan Military Academy based in 
Benghazi and there is debate about the British and American knowledge and involvement 
in the 1969 coup.
19
  In the early years after the coup, there were many signs that 
Washington was pleased with Qadhaffi’s authoritarian anti-communism and that the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) protection of both him and the RCC in general from 
                                                        
15 Ibid. p. 141. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Ibid. p. 187. 
19
 Ibid. p. 172.  
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other attempted coups.
20
  Overt support from the CIA and clandestine support from 
former CIA agents turned arms dealers during this early period demonstrates how some 
within Washington believed that Qadhaffi could be used as an effective anti-communist 
took in the MENA region.
21
  If the British and American governments did in fact aid 
Qadhaffi to power, or simply let him rise to power and subsequently protect him, it is 
evident that they never expected what was to follow.     
The original philosophy of the revolution called for the RCC to be a provisional 
authority until Libya merged with Egypt as part of a larger Arab state.
22
  The RCC was 
comprised of 14 of Qadhaffi’s fellow military officers of modest backgrounds.  They 
were also sympathetic to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s plight in Egypt. 
Upon taking power, Qadhaffi and his newly formed government embarked on various 
political, economic and social projects in Libya.  After the coup d’état, Libya’s relations 
with the United States gradually became problematic.  Qadhaffi, an admirer of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, supported pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism as 
reactions to U.S. foreign policy in the region and capitalism.  With the help of the RCC, 
Qadhaffi implemented his economic, social and political blueprint, the ‘Third Universal 
Theory’ described in his book, The Green Book (1975) that promotes Islamic socialism as 
the building block of a utopian society.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
20
 Ibid. pp. 322-323.  
21
 Ibid. p. 324.  
22
 Ibid, p. 210. 
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United States-Libya Relations:  The Reagan Era 
 
  U.S.-Libya relations during the Reagan era was defined by increasing 
confrontation and outright conflict.  Four areas that define the deteriorating relations are 
oil, terrorism, regional influence and Soviet influence.  In January 1981, CIA chief 
William Casey gave a presentation at the White House on reasserting American 
dominance across the world and the terrorist activity by Syria, Iran and Libya.
23
  In 
addition, The Reagan Doctrine called for the support of terrorist (freedom fighters) that 
struggled to overthrow left-leaning governments, while freedom fighters (terrorists) 
attempting to overthrow a right-leaning government were to be stopped.
24
  Essentially, 
this meant that the ideological beliefs of both the new Libyan government and the Reagan 
Administration were at odds.   
 After the 1969 coup that brought Qadhaffi to power, his revisionist government 
transformed Libya both economically and politically.  However, the growing internal 
opposition in Libya and its internal relations with the U.S. slowly deteriorated.  As Lisa 
Anderson notes, while imposing the revolutionary ideals, the new Libyan government 
was faced with internal opposition within the RCC that resulted in various coup attempts 
within the early years 1969 coup.  Anderson argues that Qadhaffi’s policies alienated 
both technocrats and religious leaders in Libya in 1975 and 1979, leading to many 
government defections and a growing support for exiled opposition groups.
25
  The intent 
of the revolutionary ideology was to transcend the weak Libyan national identity, 
                                                        
23
 Ibid. p. 324.  
24
 Ibid. p. 332. 
25
 Anderson, Lisa. 1986. ‘Qadhdhafi and His Opposition’. in Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring) 
p. 231.  
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however it failed among the majority of Libyans.
26
  The nepotism that was cultivated 
during the monarchy, continued throughout the Qadhaffi Regime though he declared his 
intention to eradicate in 1969.  After various assassination attempts prompted Qadhaffi to 
quickly utilize the benefits family and tribal ties could provide for security and thus 
strategically entrusted his family and tribe with the survival of his government. 
 As opposition grew in Libya, the seemingly never-ending oil wealth from the 
1970s provided the revolutionary political and economic agendas.  Their radical nature 
quickly caught the attention of Washington.  In 1979, during the Jimmy Carter 
Administration, the Iranian Revolution and the Islamist takeover of the Great Mosque in 
Mecca took place.  In the same year, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was attacked.  Wary of 
any threat to its influence abroad, the U.S. officially named Libya a state sponsor of 
terrorism and recalled its diplomats.
27
   
The 1980s proved to be a particular troublesome decade for Libya.  The drop in 
oil prices in the early 1980s resulted in the low oil revenues to the Libyan government.  
In addition, the domestic opposition in Libya during the 1980s left the government 
isolated within its own borders as numerous coup attempts resulted from increased 
political insularity as a result of the low oil revenues.
28
  During this time, the Libyan 
government also supported the northern rebels (National Liberation Front) in the Chadian 
civil war and intervened militarily in the conflict between 1981-1987.  Libya’s support 
for leftist radical groups around the world in addition to its ties to the Soviet Union 
                                                        
26
 Anderson, Lisa. 1986. ‘Religion and State in Libya:  The Politics of Identity’ in Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 483, Religion and State:  The Struggle for Legitimacy and 
Power (Jan.). p.61. 
27
 Anderson, Lisa. 2006. ‘Rogue Libya’s Long Road’ in Middle East Information and Research Project. 
No. 241, Iran:  Looking Ahead. (Winter) p. 43.  
28
 Anderson, Lisa. 1986.  p. 225.  
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troubled the Reagan Administration (1981-1989).  The Reagan Administration vowed to 
take a harsher stance on terrorism and kidnapping than the previous administrations.  
Such events were prominent during this era, and because of unpopular U.S. government 
foreign policies, Americans were the targets of choice.  As Americans were targeted 
around the world, the Reagan Administration wished to make an example out of Libya 
for funding terrorism.  Mainstream American media was used to develop a negative 
campaign against Qadhaffi that would generate public support for military strikes on 
Libya.  This campaign of disinformation led to the 1981 resignation of Bernard Kalb, the 
State Department’s spokesman and highly regarded journalist.29  The U.S. shot down two 
Libyan fighter jets in the Strait of Sirte (1981) and bombed Tripoli and Benghazi (1986) 
in retaliation for Libya’s funding of the 1986 bombing of the German discotheque, La 
Belle.  The discotheque was frequented by U.S. servicemen, and, consequently the attack 
killed two Americans.  After the terrorist attacks on Rome and Vienna airports on 
December 27
th
, 1986
30
, Reagan ordered all American oil firms to leave Libya.  These 
events punctuated the deterioration of relations between the two states.  The response of 
the Reagan Administration was numerous political and economic actions intended to 
deliberately provoke a response from Qadhaffi in order to legitimize large military strikes 
by the U.S. towards Libya.
31
   
The 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland  
                                                        
29
 Simons. p.  325.  
30
 In the 1970s and 1980s Abu Nidal and his organization, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) planned and 
carried out attacks in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.  ANO enjoyed safe haven and support from 
several governments including Iraq, Libya and Syria.  ANO claimed responsibility for the attacks on the 
Rome and Vienna airports in retaliation of the Israeli bombing of Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) headquarters in Tunis on October 1
st
, 1985. The Libyan government was accused of funding the 
Rome and Vienna airport attacks.   
31
 Zoubir, Yahia. 2002. ‘Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rouge State to Good Fellow?’ in Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February) p. 33.  
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escalated Libya’s tensions with the U.S.  This event critically changed the U.S.-Libya 
relationship as well as Libya’s rapport with the international community, particularly 
Western Europe.  International issues of legality and legitimacy ensued for almost two 
decades that would impact all aspects of U.S.-Libya relations.  The U.S. and Britain 
indicted the Libyan state in connection with the bombing and accused two Libyan 
suspects.  As a result, the Libyan government was increasingly isolated and reassessed its 
place in the international system.  
Simons’ Libya:  The Struggle for Survival (1993) provides an important insight 
into the Libyan government and U.S.-Libya relations during the Reagan Era.  The main 
focus of the book is on the Lockerbie bombing in the context of Libya’s colonial history 
and its problematic relationship with the U.S. and Western Europe after independence.  
Simons argues that the U.S. decision to target Libya for the Lockerbie bombing is driven 
by ‘realpolitik’ objectives of a hegemonic power that sets itself above international 
organizations and international law.
32
  Simons argues that although Syrian, Iranian and 
Palestinian complicity in the Lockerbie bombing was agreed upon in the West, Libya was 
the ‘fall guy’.33  There are many theories as to who holds responsibility for the Lockerbie 
bombing, yet Simons stresses that the more credible explanation is that various 
individuals and the states of Iran, Syria, Libya, stateless Palestinians and even perhaps 
Jordan were involved in the organizing the bombing through a network of state 
terrorism.
34
  However, the U.S. and Western Europe set the stage for the Lockerbie 
retribution to be directed at Libya. 
                                                        
32
 Simons. p. 30. 
33
 Ibid. p. 10. 
34
 Ibid. p. 14. 
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The theme of hegemonic power and its repercussions for Libya throughout the 
Reagan Era and early 1990s is examined in Simons’ book.  The author also argues that in 
1991, the U.S. quickly claimed itself as victor of the Cold War and instead of promoting 
a new era of peace, it directed its efforts toward an ‘agenda of punishment’.35  With this 
in mind, Simons offers a detailed account of world events that contextualizes to U.S.-
Libya relations.   He demonstrates that throughout the 1990s, the situation for Libya 
worsened as the U.S. Congress enacted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which 
ultimately imposed sanctions on international firms doing business with Libya and Iran.  
  The history of hostilities between the two nations is grounded in their conflicting 
interests and competition to influence Africa and the Middle East during the Cold War.  
The U.S. used military and economic power to spread and maintain its influence, whereas 
Libya relied on its oil revenues in order to fund revolutionary groups and challenge 
American power around the world.  The hostilities grew more intense as a result of both 
states seeking vengeance.  Robert Bruce St. John’s Libya and The United States:  Two 
Centuries of Strife (2002) captures this dynamic and depicts Washington’s aggressive 
nature towards Tripoli.  In this work, St. John claims that Qadhaffi became a ‘symbolic 
surrogate’ for more dangerous radicals in the world who were beyond Washington’s 
reach.
36
  The U.S.’ inability to confront all presumed enemies, specifically terrorists, only 
further vilified the Libyan government and its leader.  
 From Washington’s perspective, this problematic relationship was fueled by 
Libya’s relationship with the Soviet Union, its alleged large financial support for 
extremist groups and the Lockerbie incident in 1988, and its desire to possess nuclear 
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weapons.  From Tripoli’s perspective, Libya is a small vulnerable oil-rich country in a 
world system, in which energy-hungry powerful nations dominate.  Simons argues that 
NATO became an accomplice in Washington’s Third World War on terrorism against 
poor countries.
37
  According to Simons, all NATO member states would then be 
accomplices to this war and its effort to police the Third World in order to defend 
Western interests.
38
   
 In ‘Rogue Libya’s Long Road’ (2006), Lisa Anderson argues that domestic 
policies in both the U.S. and Libya greatly shaped the U.S.-Libya relationship.  The 
altered landscape of the post-Cold War era had already resulted in both governments 
pursuing policies that neither expected.
39
   The Libyan leadership, for example was 
predominately concerned with regime survival, while the U.S. was concerned with 
maintaining its status as the lone superpower.  Beginning in 1989, the Rogue States 
Doctrine
40
 served as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy and as the nomenclature 
suggests, was perceived as a way of combating the expected military cuts by Congress 
following the anticipated fall of the Soviet Union.
41
   
A similar foreign policy regarding Libya prevailed under George H. W. Bush as 
under Reagan. The adherence to the Rogue States Doctrine by both the Reagan and the 
first Bush Administration codified a pretext for the U.S. to repeatedly shun Libya’s 
attempts at begin any serious diplomatic negotiations about normalizing relations. The 
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first Bush Administration was more cautious with Libya than the Reagan Administration 
as it was aware that Qadhaffi’s hatred to Islamist fundamentalists could prove to be 
beneficial to U.S. interests.
42
  In addition, U.S. officials worried that if Qadhaffi was 
removed, the lack of a clear Libyan successor would instigate chaos in a country where 
tribal affiliations were stronger than the political system.
43
  Therefore, U.S. attention was 
focused more on Iraq and the events that culminated into its invasion of Kuwait.  
The Persian Gulf War
44
 demonstrated the hegemonic power of the U.S. and its 
unchallenged power in the Middle East.  The awareness of the increased hegemonic 
threat in the region worried Libya. This fear, combined with internal economic and 
political pressures in Libya forced the Libyan government to reposition itself more 
favorably towards the U.S. and Western Europe in order to ensure regime survival.  The 
growing domestic insecurity forced Tripoli to reconsider its international isolation in 
order to secure help (money and weapons) from the U.S. in its fight with insurgents.   
 
United States-Libya Relations:  The Clinton Era 
 While the 1980s was a decade of confrontation for U.S.-Libya relations, the 1990s 
sidelined any development in Libya’s oil industry.  In the 1990s, oil prices increased, yet 
Libya was unable to purchase much needed technology and relied on outdated 
infrastructure that limited their ability to achieve the full financial potential of its oil 
reserves.
45
  Obtaining the full financial potential of Libya’s oil reserves was extremely 
                                                        
42
 St. John. 2002. p. 165.  
43
 Ibid.  
44
 The Persian Gulf War (August 1990 – February 1991) was waged by a United Nations authorized 
Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States, against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and 
annexation of Kuwait. 
45
 Kawczynski. Daniel. 2010. Seeking Gaddafi. London:  Dialogue. p. 167.  
 23 
crucial to Libyan government’s ability to remain in power.  As a result of the worrisome 
economic situation in Libya, the 1990s signaled extensive economic reforms in Libya, the 
beginning of an era of negotiations with the U.S. and U.N. regarding their server 
sanctions targeting Libya.  Regardless of party affiliation, Washington’s tough stance 
towards Libya continued.  In the 1990s, the international community, however, began to 
view the harsh U.S. foreign policy and sanctions against Libya as illegitimate.  In ‘Libya 
in US Foreign Policy: From Rouge State to Good Fellow?’ (2002), Zahia Zoubir argues 
that as a result of the harsh foreign policy and military strikes on Libyan soil, many 
Libyans and citizens of the developing countries viewed Qadhaffi as a victim of U.S. 
bullying and hegemonic power.
46
  Zoubir further argues that the irony of the Rogue 
States Doctrine and the punishments inflicted on Libya actually led to Qadhaffi enjoying 
a certain level of legitimacy that he would otherwise not have had in the eyes of most 
Libyans.
47
 
Qadhaffi was hopeful that the 1992 American presidential campaign would yield 
a democratic president and change the direction of U.S. foreign policy.
48
  Clinton won the 
election but was constrained in his ability to reorient his foreign policy, particularly 
toward rogue states such as Libya.  The Libyan diplomats sent to negotiate with the 
Clinton Administration were full of hope in moving state relations forward, yet the 
Clinton Administration further ignored the Libyan diplomats and instead subjected Libya 
to harsher sanctions.
49
  President Clinton’s Administration was tougher on Libya than the 
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previous administration of George H. Bush.
50
  Both the Clinton Administration and the 
Republican-held Congress drove this tough stance.  Although, Clinton did hope to engage 
Libya, but he had to do so carefully in order to avoid problems with the families of the 
Lockerbie victims.
51
  During his presidential campaign, Clinton promised the families of 
the Lockerbie victims that he would tighten international sanctions on Libya.
52
  Clinton 
kept his promise and toughened the international sanctions on Libya to ensure that the 
families of the Lockerbie incident were compensated and the Lockerbie suspects were 
surrendered.
53
  Little support for Libya existed in the U.S., even among liberal 
politicians.
54
  Various initiatives in Congress targeted Libya in addition to international 
firms doing business with Libya.
55
  In addition, then Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, threatened Libya with a global oil embargo meant to cripple the Libyan 
economy that relied almost solely on its crude oil exports.
56
  
Amidst Libya’s international tribulations, the domestic economic and political 
situation in Libya was increasingly turbulent.  Libya, like several MENA countries in the 
late 1990s was suffering from economic stagnation, and declining gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth rates.
57
  The low oil prices of the 1990s were particularly problematic to 
Libya as it relied almost solely on oil revenues. In ‘Political and Economic Developments 
in Libya in the 1990s’ (1999), Mary Jane Deeb argues that the Libyan government faced 
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armed opposition from myriad factions: its military, secular opposition organizations 
formed outside of Libya, Islamist Groups and tribal opposition
58
.  The decline in 
economic growth and lowered living standards resulted in domestic instability.  The 
Libyan military, alone planned numerous coup attempts, specifically in the 1990s.
59
   
Eastern Libya was known for its Islamist opposition to Qadhaffi’s regime.  The 
Libyan regime fueled further unrest by intentionally ignoring development needs of this 
region.  Despite Libya’s oil wealth, poverty and underdevelopment was rampant in 
eastern Libya.
60
  As the result of regional Islamist uprisings in Libya in the 1980s and 
mid-1990s, the regime punished the city of Benghazi by blocking resources and 
infrastructure needs.
61
  Accompanying the economic punishments by the regime was the 
continued widespread state violence.  In 1996, a massacre of 1,300 prisoners at Tripoli’s 
top security prison, Abu Salim, further antagonized the eastern population, as most of 
those murdered were from the region.   
This turbulent atmosphere was further destabilized by the Libyan government’s 
attempted economic reforms.  Dirk Vandewalle’s Libya Since Independence:  Oil and 
State-Building (1998), focuses on the institutional aspects of state-building by distributive 
states with a specific focus on Libya.  In response to the economic crisis induced by low 
oil revenues, the Libyan government began its infitah, marked by two phases of reforms.
 
 
The first phase of 1987-1990s introduced self-management of cooperatives, whereas the 
second phase of the 1990s introduced more vigorous reforms meant to withdrawal the 
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state from the economy.
62
  Vandewalle asserts that the second wave of reforms was 
politically dangerous for the regime as it impacted the social groups who benefited from 
their elite status via connections to the government and thus the basis of its support.
63
 
Although the emergence of a group of technocrats supported the reforms, Libya’s infitah 
was never fully implemented as pressured by the regime’s major clients who had the 
most to lose.
64
  Vandewalle further argues that even if fully implemented, the infitah 
would have failed because Libya possessed neither the administrative, institutional 
capability or the genuine political will to implement and enforce measures that reversed 
policies meant to ensure regime survival instead of a functioning economy.
65
  
The Libyan government could no longer ignore the necessity of implementing 
economic reforms and updating the aging infrastructure of its oil sector.  Foreign 
investment was badly needed, for the oil sector’s infrastructure update.  Moreover, 
extensive oil and natural gas exploration had yet to be carried out in Libya.  To this date, 
three quarters of the Libyan territory remain unexplored, and are believed to hold 
enormous oil and natural gas deposits, despite executives from international oil and gas 
companies ranking Libya as the top site in the world for exploration.
66
  Libya’s reliance 
on foreign expertise and technology in its oil industry had actually hindered the growth of 
Libya’s oil industry.  These trends provided an incentive for the regime to normalize its 
relations with the West. 
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Further complicating the domestic situation in Libya during this decade were the 
U.S. and U.N. imposed sanctions as a result of the Lockerbie bombing.  The U.N. 
imposed sanctions in 1992 and 1993, ultimately placed Libya under one of the most 
comprehensive embargoes ever imposed in the Middle East at that time. 
67
  The May 
1993 U.N. sanctions that restricted air travel to Libya also made the delivery of spare 
parts for the oil industry virtually impossible.
68
  The sanctions included an arms embargo 
and it froze Libyan government funds abroad and decreased the number of diplomats 
globally.
69
  In the journal article, ‘The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism:  Libya 
and the U.N. Sanctions 1992-2003’ (2005), Ian Hurd examines how Libya interpreted the 
norms of liberal internationalism in order to delegitimize the sanctions promoted by the 
U.S., Britain and France.  Hurd asserts that both the U.S. and Britain were forced to chose 
between either upholding and maintaining the increasingly unpopular U.N. sanctions 
against Libya, or defending the legitimacy of the UNSC in the eyes of the world.
70
  The 
U.S. and Britain eventually compromised in 1998 by lifting some of the sanctions in 
order to preserve the power legitimacy of the Security Council instead of maintaining a 
hard line against Libya.
71
  
The growing domestic insecurity forced Tripoli to reconsider its international 
isolation in order to secure international help by way of money and weapons in its fight 
with insurgents.  In April of 1999, Tripoli agreed to surrender the two Libyan Lockerbie 
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suspects for a trial under a Scottish Court in The Hague, Netherlands.
72
  Although this 
was a political win for the U.S., its relationship with Libya continued to be worrisome.    
The continuation of Libya’s WMD program was uncovered as Libya had been extremely 
involved in the Abdul Kadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan) network.
73
  Libya was a recipient of 
materials from Khan’s network from 1997-2004.74  In addition, a financial settlement for 
the Lockerbie families remained unresolved.  As a result, the Clinton Administration 
continued to be firm in respect to Libya.  One of the last official acts performed by the 
Clinton Administration was the notification of Congress of the continuation of the state 
of emergency with Libya, originally declared in 1986.
75
  Therefore, although the 
groundwork for improved relations had been laid, much work was left in order to 
officially improve and officially normalize U.S.-Libya relations.  
Britain was a key leader and at times, intermediary in Libya’s reorientation with 
the U.S. and Western Europe.  Historically, as earlier discussed, it was partly responsible 
for the nascent Libyan state, installed its monarchy, and some argue that it even 
supported Qadhaffi’s coup.  Britain also shared a history of turbulent and violent relations 
with Libya.  Britain’s national interest in the workings of the Libyan government 
increased in the late 1972 when Qadhaffi met with senior members of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA)
76
 Army Council
77
.  Qadhaffi’s arms shipments and monies to the 
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IRA terrorized the British population for decades.
78
  Moreover, the Lockerbie bombing 
occurred on its soil.  Negotiations between the British and Libyan governments allowed 
for the British government to obtain Libya’s vital intelligence on the IRA79 and settle the 
international Lockerbie legal disputes.   
Although, much of Qadhaffi’s extreme rhetoric was directed towards Britain and 
the U.S., France also shared a deeply troubled history with Libya.
80
  During the 1980s, 
France and Libya supported different factions in the war in Chad and in September 1989, 
the French flight UTA Flight 772 from Brazzaville, The Republic of Congo to Paris blew 
up in mid air, killing all aboard.
81
  Libya’s problematic relations with France are 
important to keep in mind.  Further along in this study, it will aid in the explanation of 
France’s role in the 2011 Libyan conflict.     
It took years of negotiations and help from the British government for Libya to 
make slow rapprochement progress with the U.S.  Owing to the changing domestic and 
international political environments, the Libyan government was forced to accept the 
international status quo in order to improve the probability of its survival.  However, the 
Libyan government did defend itself against the U.S. and the international community by 
questioning the way in which the structural power of the world order both controlled and 
manipulated Libya.  The Libyan government not only questioned the U.S. foreign policy 
incentives for the Rogue States Doctrine, but also helped to delegitimize the U.S. and 
U.N. sanctions against Libya in the eyes of the international community.    
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CHAPTER 3    
 
United States-Libyan Relations Post-9/11:  Qadhaffi as Terrorist Fighter  
 
 Alliances between states can increase the probability of survival; they also 
potentially increase political leverage with international institutions.  Although 
Qadhaffi’s core belief was that the Third World nations are victimized by powerful 
nations that use race to maintain their global hegemony,
82
 he understood that his regime’s 
survival was increasingly in peril.  Libya was in a precarious situation.  It had no real 
allies and therefore no real support from international institutions.  In 2001, however, 
Libya was in a unique position to make an alliance with the U.S.  9/11 allowed many 
Arab regimes to join the ‘war on terror’ by suppressing domestic opposition by 
identifying them as terrorists.
83
  After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington D.C., the U.S. increased its economic, security and military ties 
with the central Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya.
84
  Libya, 
like other North African governments was quick to integrate itself in the international war 
on terror and violently repress their citizens in the name of fighting terror.
85
  In addition, 
Libya learned from Pakistan and Egypt that becoming an ally in the ‘war on terror’ was 
rewarded with less democratic reform rhetoric from Washington.
86
  These actions of 
                                                        
82
 Simons, pp. 263-264.  
83
 Albrecht, H., Schlumberger, O.  2004. ‘Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without Democratization in 
the Middle East’ in International Political Science Review 25, no. 4, p. 377. 
84
 Zoubir, Yahia. 2006.  ‘America Policy in the Maghreb:  The Conquest of a New Region.’ Area: 
Mediterranean & Arab World. WP 13. (July). Retrieved May 15th 2010 from 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_engContentWCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/
elcano_in/zonas_in/mediterranean+arab+world/dt13-2006 
85
 Ibid. p. 2006 
86
 Toensing, Chris. 2008. “Libya’s Fat Cat” in The Middle East Report. Retrieved February 19, 2010 from:  
http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped011108.html 
 31 
North African governments resulted in a heightened anti-Americanism in the region.
87
  
Of these countries, Libya stands out because of its historic tensions with the U.S. and the 
opportunity that the events of 9/11 created for improved relations with the U.S.  After 
9/11, the Libyan government quickly offered its cooperation with the U.S. in the ‘war on 
terror’.88  Ironically, the terrorist elements that led to Libya’s international isolation 
became one of its negotiating tools.  The nation’s intelligence on international terrorist 
networks allowed it to reinvent itself as an ally towards the West.  Subsequently, the U.S. 
fast-tracked the normalization process.   
 Since Libya had a history of supporting terrorist groups on a global scale, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks could have served as the justifiable pretext for a U.S. military attack on 
Libya.  Hypothetically, Libya could have served as a safe haven and training grounds for 
Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden since Libya had a history of funding, arming and training 
terrorists.
89
  However, Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were considered a liability for the 
Libyan state.  The mutual distrust and contempt shared by Washington and Tripoli for 
Al-Qaeda proved advantageous for the Libyan government.   
  Libya, was seemingly an easy target for U.S. military action in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks on NY and Washington D.C.  These events, however, marked a dramatic 
phase in U.S.-Libya relations.  Libyan cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terror was 
driven by the fact that Tripoli and Washington shared some of the same enemies, namely 
Islamist groups, most notably Al Qaeda.
90
  A long-time target of Islamist militants, the 
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Libyan government was eager to share its knowledge of terrorist suspects and networks 
with the U.S. in exchange for the advancement of diplomatic negotiations.
91
 Qadhaffi 
issued the first International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) warrants for Osama 
bin Laden back in 1998 after an alleged assassination attempt was made on his life by Bin 
Laden.
92
  
 The renewed U.S.-Libya relationship is an arrangement of convenience.  The 9/11 
attacks exposed the vulnerability of the U.S. as the global hegemonic power, and this 
provided an opening for Libya.  It was in the interest of the U.S. security services to work 
with Libya in order to gain Libyan knowledge of terrorist networks and to have a greater 
presence in the ‘war on terror’ in North Africa.    
 Libya’s vulnerability increased in the post-9/11 world.  The two principal reasons 
for Libya’s reorientation towards the West were Qadhaffi’s fear of regime change 
(internal or external) and the economic losses endured by Libya as a result of the two 
decades of isolation.  As 9/11 became the focus of the second Bush Administration, the 
new Bush doctrine of preventive war was articulated in the U.S. National Security 
Guidelines on September 20th, 2001.  This document called for unlimited American 
military action regardless of international law or U.N. resolutions.
93
  As George W. Bush 
propagated his goal to legitimize American military action against a government or 
terrorist group of choice, the Libyan government carefully positioned itself as a U.S. ally.  
Because of its history of support for terrorists, Qadhaffi’s regime was an easy target for 
U.S. military action.  The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq impacted Libya’s 
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decisions concerning the U.S. demands on reaching a Lockerbie Settlement and ending 
its own WMD program.  Moreover, the economic cost of isolation was great.  The U.N. 
sanctions had cost Libya an estimated $33 billion dollars in lost revenues from 1992 to 
2001.
94
  The threat of military strikes, a possible U.S. invasion of Libya and both the U.S. 
and U.N. sanctions served as key ‘tools of U.S. hegemony’ that were meant to destabilize 
the Libyan government.    
 
The Lockerbie Settlement (2002) & Libya’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program  
As the U.S. pursued its controversial ‘war on terror’, Tripoli was extremely wary 
of George W. Bush’s September 2002 National Security Strategy also known as the Bush 
Doctrine.
95
  The Libyan government feared that Libya was a potential target for a U.S. 
invasion.  As a result, the Libyan government eventually acquiesced to all U.S. demands 
to initiate normalized relations in order to avoid the risk of regime change and fully 
integrate in the international economy.  The Lockerbie Settlement proved to be a critical 
political and symbolic step for U.S.-Libya relations.  While Libya may have been coerced 
into this settlement, it simultaneously served as a means for its government to buy its way 
into the good graces of the U.S. and international community.  On March 11, 2002 Libya 
accepted a verdict of responsibility for the Lockerbie and subsequently agreed to pay the 
families of the victims a total of 2.7 million.
96
   
 The settlement was seemingly a symbolic closure of a bitter economic and 
political history between both countries.  Although, some observers argue that Libya was 
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able to manipulate the U.S. and other countries in order to influence the Lockerbie 
dispute,
97
 it was clear that the Libyan government was acting in self-defense against the 
global hegemon and the unjust interstate system.  Although Libya ultimately surrendered 
its Lockerbie suspects and complied with all U.N. and U.S. demands, some observers 
believe that Libya was the final winner in U.S.-Libya relations since it was able to 
maneuver normalized relations.
98
  
 Regardless of the Lockerbie Settlement, Libya’s WMD program was still an 
obstacle for normalization.  Regime survival was the motive for Libya’s nuclear goals.99  
The nation’s small geographical size and porous borders left Libya vulnerable to external 
intervention.
100
  The natural desire of a sovereign state’s self-protection is the right to 
develop deterrence capabilities and Qadhaffi hoped to be the first Arab State to obtain a 
nuclear bomb.
101
  His concern with Israel’s nuclear weapons and the nuclear capabilities 
of western powers, such as the U.S., were named as justifications for Arabs to obtain 
their own nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence in the region.
102
   
On December 19, 2003 Libyan Foreign Minister, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Chalgam, announced Libya’s official decision to be free of internationally banned 
weapons.
103
  Based on U.S. and Western European intelligence, Libya had paid Khan 
over $100 million for the transfer of nuclear technology and supplies.
104
   While 
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intelligence and diplomacy were two of the real successful tools used by Washington to 
further shape the negotiations with Libya, the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq 
ultimately changed the political dynamic in ways that the decade of negotiations between 
Britain, Libya and the U.S. could not produce.  This decision was the result of years of 
secret negotiations between Britain, Libya and the U.S. that ultimately led to Libya’s 
nuclear disarmament.
105
  
Despite Qadhaffi’s 42 years of rule, he failed to accomplish most of his 
ideological vision for Libya and his various unification attempts for North Africa, Africa 
and the Arab World.  In fact, Qadhaffi’s goals became simpler after many ambitions 
failed.  Qadhaffi’s enthusiasm about attaining the good graces of Washington is indicated 
in a speech delivered in 2002, on his thirty-third year anniversary of power:  “We must 
comply with international legality even though it has been falsified and imposed by the 
United States, or we will be slaughtered.”106  Over time, Qadhaffi’s concerns with 
regaining oil wealth and regime survival trumped his ideological pursuits.  Instead of 
meeting with guerilla leaders and terrorists, most of Qadhaffi’s visitors during the 
rapprochement period were future investment consultants and internet executives.
107
  
Qadhaffi, by no means, changed many of his core ideological beliefs or altered his overall 
perception of the U.S., the West and the world order.  Yet, the political climate had 
changed dramatically and being isolated by Western powers proved very costly and 
internally destabilizing for Libya.   
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The economic structural changes within Libya and the entire MENA region 
actually instigated further instability in the region.  By 2004, the IMF was urging for 
“significant acceleration of the pace of structural adjustment”,108 or the removal of excess 
governmental controls to promote market competition and satisfy the neoliberal agenda 
of the World Bank.  In Libya, the regimes’ response was two-fold and included further 
liberalization with the intent on attracting foreign direct investment from Europe, North 
Africa and China along with bilateral free trade agreements with the E.U. and U.S. 
through a massive privatization program.
109
  Secondly, like Libya, numerous other 
MENA countries adopted the Bush Administration’s ‘global war on terror’ framework, 
which ultimately supported their internal repression of dissent.
110
   
In March 2004, Tony Blair visited Qadhaffi, the first British Prime Minister to 
visit Libya since 1969.
111
  This meeting resulted in an agreement between the Libyan 
government to halt all terrorist funding in exchange for British help in extracting Libya’s 
oil reserves.
112
  This meeting served as the official restoration of ties between Britain and 
Libya.  As Britain and Libya officially renewed ties, formal relations between the U.S. 
and Libya renewed in 2006 with the exchange of diplomats.
113
  Additional progress was 
made on May 15, 2007 when Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, reported that Libya 
has been removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism
114
 for the first time since 
1979.  In January 2005, Libya awarded eleven out of fifteen onshore and offshore 
                                                        
108
 Zoubir, Yahia H. 1999. North Africa in Transition:  State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 
1990s. Edited by Yahia H. Zoubir.  Gainesville:  University Press of Florida. p. 1. 
109
 Ibid.  
110
 Ibid.  
111
 Kawczynski. p. 162.  
112
 Blitz, James and Saigol, Lisa. ‘Libya: No Line in the Sand’ in Financial Times, February 25, 2011. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/198e48b4-411a-11e0-bf62-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DMK4AD59 
113
 Kaplan. 2007. 
114
 Ibid.  
 37 
exploration contracts to U.S. companies.
115
  It was clear that the Libyan government 
wanted the U.S. companies to once again maintain an important role in the country’s oil 
sector.
116
 December 2008 formally marked the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
the arrival in Tripoli of Gene Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya.  The new U.S.-Libya 
alliance seemingly bolstered the Libyan government.  It was expected, both in Libya and 
the international community, that Qadhaffi’s son, Seif Al Islam, would take over Libya 
and further expand the economic reforms of liberalization and privatization with Prime 
Minister Shukri Ghanem.  In 2006, Libya’s continued inability to diversify its economy 
away from its oil and gas sectors resulted in the consistent burden of the state in 
providing services and jobs for Libyan citizens.
117
  Reformers in the Libyan government, 
such a Ghanem had difficulty arguing for and implementing some of the necessary 
changes as a result of hardliners who disagreed with the neoliberal agenda.
118
  The 
debates on economic reforms and their implementation worsened after the international 
financial crisis that began in 2007, yet the neoliberal reformers in Libya felt stymied.
119
  
In 2008, a prominent Tripoli attorney and friend of Ghanem explained to the Charges 
d’Affaires in the U.S. Embassy that the reformers believed that no shock-type therapy 
economic reforms would occur in Libya while Qadhaffi remained in power.
120
 
Libya had gone from being a leading opponent of American hegemony in the 
region to an ally in the war on terror, and a status quo power.  It had acquiesced, in neo-
Gramscian terms, to the dictates of the international order.   It no longer sought to subvert 
                                                        
115
 Vandewalle. 2006. p. 186.  
116
 Ibid. p. 187.  
117
 Otman, Waniss & Karlberg, Erling. p. 22.  
118
 Prashad, Vijay. 2012.  Arab Spring, Libyan Winter.  Edinburgh:  AK Press. p. 134.  
119
 Ibid.  
120
 Ibid. p. 145.  
 38 
the neo-liberal economic system, but, rather, hoped to use it to work with it in order to 
ensure its survival from both internal enemies and the threat of external invasion.  Libya, 
therefore, approached its historic shift with the U.S. in terms of a realist perspective and 
sought to maneuver itself as best it could to ensure regime survival.  The Lockerbie 
Settlement and renunciation of its WMD program were strategic moves used by the 
Libyan government in order to negotiate the best scenario possible for the its survival.   
 
CHAPTER 4   
 
The Arab Spring and its Impact on United States-Libya Relations:  Overview of the 
Arab Spring and Libya’s Uprising (February 2011)  
 
 
During the winter of 2011, the American and international agendas were focused 
on the status quo issues of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the Iranian nuclear 
program.
121
  However, deep structural changes in the public spheres of the MENA region 
resulted in a balance of power shift in favor of the publics from autocratic regimes.
122
  
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’s uprisings shared many of the same underpinnings (social, 
economic and political problems).  In the late 1980s, the three states pursued a degree of 
economic and political liberalization that ultimately impoverished the middle and lower 
class.
123
  In addition, the liberalization programs actually undermined the autocratic 
regimes causing splits in the business elite and further alienating the educated middle 
class with the increased arbitrary state behavior, lack of rule of law and rising 
corruption.
124
  The economic and political liberalization efforts fueled more dissent 
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among the populations of several of the MENA countries and ultimately aided in the fall 
of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan regimes.  Massive public protests throughout 
December 2010 to February 2011 forced Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and Egyptian President, Husni Mubarak from power.   
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt increased existing tensions in Libya.  For 
observers without prior knowledge of Libya’s domestic social, political and economic 
problems, it appeared as though the Libyan protestors were simply following their North 
African neighbor’s uprisings.  However, as previously discussed, the Libyan government 
was not only the decades-long target of various armed internal opposition groups, it also 
suffered a serious lack of legitimacy among the majority of its citizens.  Although, the 
post-9/11 era provided some hope for Libyans in terms of economic and potential 
political development, the overall disenchantment with the state was rampant.   
State violence was a key reason for this bitterness.  In the Libyan city of 
Benghazi, the families of the victims of the1996 Abu Salem prison massacre had 
organized in order to request information from the Libyan government regarding the 
prison killings.  On February 11, 2011, security personnel arrested Fathi Terbil, a 
Benghazi lawyer, representing the families of the victims of the massacre.  The arrest of 
Terbil sparked a planned ‘day of rage’ (February 17th) protest in Benghazi.  As the 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt unfolded, the tension in Benghazi escalated.  Protests 
started before the official ‘day of rage’ that was planned.  On February 15th 2011, protests 
began in the city of Benghazi and later spread to other eastern Libyan cities.  Libya’s 
initial nonviolent protests quickly erupted into an all-out secession, or multiple separate 
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secessions, from the failed Libyan state.
125
  The majority of western Libya (with the 
capital of Tripoli) was a stronghold for the Libyan government.  The rebels held much of 
eastern Libya and the rebel city of Benghazi.   
The shared characteristic of the protestors in the three North African nations did 
not represent one faction of society or political orientation; their unification was in the 
pursuit of the demise of their corrupt and ineffective autocracies.
126
  Although, the 
majority of Libyans supported the overthrow of Qadhaffi, his regime’s support base was 
broader than the dictators of Egypt and Tunisia.
127
  Ultimately, the Libyan uprising was 
profoundly different than the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.  Libya experienced a part 
uprising-part civil war against the 42 years of Qadhaffi’s dictatorship.  
The widespread feelings of alienation were shared by the majority of Libyans in 
relation to the Libyan state, and are rooted in the decades of exclusion, oppression and 
injustice that were practiced by the successive authoritarian systems of the Turkish, 
Italian, the monarchical regime and the post-1969 military regime of Qadhaffi.
128
  
Mabrooka Al-Werfalli’s book, Political Alienation in Libya (2011) argues that the 
attitude of alienation is a basic predictor of important political behaviors.
129
  Her study 
focuses on the post-1969 regime as political alienation grew throughout the period of the 
self-proclaimed Libyan revolution, as conditions of alienation including other factors 
(i.e., outbreak of corruption, diffuse distrust and unrelieved dissatisfaction) have all 
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contributed to the serious erosion of Qadhaffi and his regime’s legitimacy.130  There are 
two explanations for the conditions that instigated the individual in Libya from passivity 
to radical (the armed Intifada and protests, pre-2011) and revolutionary behavior (The 
Arab Spring).   One hypothesis is that a generational gap is an important element of 
political alienation in Libya as 60% of Libya’s population was below the age of fifteen in 
1996.
131
  Therefore, the majority of the population does not share a significant investment 
in the historical legitimacy of the post coup regime in addition to having extreme 
dissatisfaction as a result of the lower standard of living in Libya.
132
  A second hypothesis 
is that the regime’s failure for successful reform compelled the individual in Libya to 
adopt active behavior.
133
  Both hypotheses ring true in Libya’s case.  As the Libyan state 
failed the majority of Libyans by lacking a shared political ideology and failing to meet 
their basic economic needs, their growing dissent destabilized the government.    
 The authoritarian regime in Libya largely based its legitimacy on its revolutionary 
character, however after decades of misrule, the leftist ideology of the regime rang 
hollow.  A new criteria of legitimacy was demanded by the Libyans and others across the 
MENA region,
134
 and it was here that Qadhaffi’s regime fell short.  As mentioned 
previously, the Libyan intifada, unlike the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Yemeni intifadas is 
unique because of its armed character and as a result, is viewed more as a war than a 
revolution.
135
  Since Qadhaffi responded to internal opposition (particularly the Islamist 
uprisings from 1996 onwards) and previous demonstrations in such a violent manner, it 
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was widely understood by Libyans that only extreme violence and sabotage from citizens 
would weaken the regime until it was brought down.
136
  A second feature would be the 
tribal character of the armed forces (and the state), and the weak institutions of Libyan 
state and society.  All of these issues contributed to the tendency towards fragmentation, 
which subsequently played out in the streets.   
 
The International Military Intervention in the Libyan Conflict (March 2011) 
Libya attempted to ensure security and maximize its power by normalizing 
relations with the U.S.  This strategy, however, had its limits.  When the Arab Spring 
complicated political relationships and the regime sought to retain its grip on power 
through violence, the Libyan regime found little support among its allies.  The Qadhaffi 
regime, in short was expendable.  Qadhaffi was acutely aware of the political and 
economic power possessed by the U.S., Western Europe and the Arab Gulf states.  He 
often vocalized his distrust of these state leaders and the international system in general.  
Frequently, he publicly insulted specific state leaders for policy decisions.  He was 
particularly very critical of Arab heads of state yet, he often expressed his concern for the 
shared future of Arab leaders, especially in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  During 
a 2008 Arab Summit Meeting in Damascus, Syria, Qadhaffi criticized the Arab states for 
allowing the U.S. to invade and occupy Iraq and warned them that any Arab state could 
be the next U.S. target.
137
  Qadhaffi’s daughter Aisha even served as a lawyer on the 
deposed Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein’s legal defense team during the Iraqi Special 
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Tribunal that began in October 2005.  Qadhaffi viewed the invasion of Iraq as a further 
threat to his regime’s survival. Therefore, despite the fact that Libya restored relations 
with the U.S., the relationship proved hollow once the Libyan government used excessive 
force on the protesters during the Arab Spring.  The Libyan conflict brought uncertainty 
within Libya’s borders and with its relationship with the U.S.  Libya, just recently 
accepted as a U.S. ally, quickly erupted into a civil war.  This violence ultimately made 
Qadhaffi more of a liability for the U.S. in the eyes of the international community, 
particularly in the Arab World.   
Although the main focus of this project is U.S.-Libya relations, it is impossible to 
ignore other powerful states, transnational alliances and international institutions that 
influenced the debate on the intervention in Libya.  It is in this context that one can see 
how both the Arab World and the international community’s demands for an intervention 
in Libya was quite complex; personal animosities and political motives drove the Gulf 
States objectives for intervention, humanitarian considerations informed the news 
coverage, and the Western animosity towards the Qadhaffi regime all played into the 
unfolding situation.
138
   
The Gulf state animosity towards Libya is rooted in both fear and personal 
animosities.  Qadhaffi and fellow officers staged a coup against the Libyan Monarchy in 
1969 and the Libyan government supported ‘freedom fighters’ all around the world that 
ignited fear in the Gulf Arab monarchies in addition to states benefiting from the status 
quo.  Qadhaffi regularly dismissed the prestige that the Saudi rulers enjoyed as a result of 
their close relationship with the U.S. and their guardianship of Islam’s holiest sites.139  He 
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often called for the Arab World to wage jihad, or a holy war on the Saudi Monarchy and 
take control of the holy sites.
140
  Libyan involvement is also rumored in the bombing of 
the Saudi embassy in Sudan in March 1973.
141
 
In addition, in July 2004, Qadhaffi was accused of plotting an assassination 
attempt on then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.142  Qadhaffi publicly 
embarrassed Saudi King Abdullah and Qatari Emir Hamad Al Thani on numerous 
occasions.  On one such occasion, at an Arab Summit in Doha in 2009, Qadhaffi 
publically called King Abdullah a "British product and American ally" and when the host 
of the summit, Emir Al Thani attempted to quiet him, Qhadhaffi walked out of the 
summit.
143
  Therefore, it became no surprise that King Abdullah and Emir Al Thani were 
key figures in support of the Libyan rebels.   
Moreover, an important element of the framing of the Libyan conflict and the 
Arab Spring was the media coverage ran by Al-Jazeera.  Al-Jazeera is a Qatari-owned 
media outlet, owned by a member of the Qatari Royal Family (Emir Al Thani), therefore 
raising important questions pertaining to Qatari intentions behind the coverage of the 
Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa, and specifically in Libya.
144
  The intense focus 
and negative portrayal of the media coverage on the state violence against protestors in 
Libya, not only gave the Libyan rebels more prestige in the Arab World, but the coverage 
also framed the public debate on an international intervention in Libya.  The overall 
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narrative in the Arab World was of Libya as the defining factor of the ultimate Arab 
struggle against authoritarianism and its outcome was seen as fundamentally tied to the 
fate of the entire region.
145
  If Qadhaffi continued his reign on power, it would have had a 
devastating psychological affect on the entire region.
146
  Al-Jazeera became the voice of 
the Arab Spring and ultimately was used as a weapon in regional politics through its 
coverage.
147
  Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the conflict in Libya was highly emotionally 
charged in the Arab World as Qadhaffi’s brutality occurred at the highest point of the 
Arab World’s identification to the struggle after the successes of Cairo and Tunis.148   
In the West, the debate for intervention was focused predominately on 
humanitarian grounds.  Intervening militarily in a foreign conflict constitutes a violation 
of a sovereign state’s rights, however, the question as to if and when a military 
intervention should take place in a foreign conflict can become a moral dilemma.  The 
international outcry for the failure to respond quickly to threats of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity compelled the U.N. to establish the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Initiative in 2005.  Ideally, this initiative would aid in 
better decision-making in terms of selected interventions by the international community, 
however it can also promote fear and provide justifications for interventions that perhaps 
are not truly warranted.  Therefore the general debate on intervention and the use of the 
R2P initiative are clearly sensitive issues since decisions such as intervention, war and 
reconciliation are fueled by ‘realpolitik’ objectives in an ever-changing world.   
                                                        
145
 Ibid. p.173.  
146
 Ibid.  
147
 Ibid. p. 90. 
148
 Ibid. p. 168. 
 46 
In Washington, the debate about supporting a military intervention in Libya was 
contentious, even within the Obama Administration.  President Obama claimed that the 
intervention was predominately or humanitarian purposes
149
 and it is clear that the 
humanitarian considerations made by Obama’s Human Rights Advisor, Samantha Power, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the U.S.’ U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice helped 
motivate key officials in the administration in support of the intervention.  The argument 
was based on a liberal internationalist perspective and goal of activist foreign policy.  The 
Obama Administration was concerned about preventing a potential humanitarian crisis in 
Benghazi and throughout Libya.  This is particularly true since the Clinton 
Administration is haunted by the outcomes of past interventions and inaction.  
The 1993 bloody humanitarian mission in Mogadishu, Somalia produced fear in 
the Clinton Administration in terms of future interventions.  The U.S. inaction in the 
1994 Rwandan genocide is still heavy on the conscious of former President William 
Clinton, former first lady Hillary Clinton, and former security advisor Susan Rice.
150
  
Moreover, the conflict in Yugoslavia led to the July 1995 genocide of more than eight 
thousand Bosnian males in the U.N. safe haven town of Srebrenica, Bosnia.  These 
veterans of the Clinton Administration feared that a similar slaughter was about to unfold 
in Benghazi and that American military power ought to be used to avoid repeating a past 
mistake of not intervening.
151
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Samantha Power, then a journalist, covering the war in Yugoslavia was a tough 
critic of the Clinton Administration’s inaction in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia.  She 
questioned the administration’s complicity with the Rwandan genocide in her piece 
‘Bystanders to Genocide’ in the September 2001 Atlantic magazine.  Moreover, in her 
book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (2003).  Power provides 
an analysis of genocides in the 20
th
 century and argues that America’s response in 
preventing genocide has been tragically inadequate.  The Rwandan genocide inspired a 
sense of urgency from Hillary Clinton, Rice and Power when Qadhaffi threatened 
violence towards Libyan dissidents.   
The case for intervention was also fostered by such diverse politicians and 
opinion-makers, Bill Clinton, Bill Kristol, Fareed Zakaraia as well as Newt Gingrich, 
Christopher Hitchens, John McCain and John Kerry.  Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee chairman John Kerry, a close confidant to President Obama warned of 
repeating mistakes made in Iraqi Kurdistan, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
failing to step in and halt a slaughter.
152  
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates along with National Security Advisor 
Thomas E. Donilon and Counterterrorism Chief, John O. Brennan, opposed U.S. 
involvement in Libya.  They shared a realist perspective towards an intervention in 
Libya; they opposed U.S. involvement in Libya and did not view Libya as a vital 
strategic interest.
153
  According to Gates, Libya is not a vital interest yet the U.S. does has 
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interest in Libya and the region.
154
  Others argued that an intervention in Libya should 
only occur if there is a convincing case for intervention, an understanding of who the 
U.S. and its allies would be supporting and an actual comprehensive military plan.
155
  
Some argued that inaction in Libya would not only be morally wrong, but it 
would appear as though the international community would condone extreme state 
violence from other autocrats in the Middle East and around the world.
156
   Others argued 
that not intervening would ultimately lead to American intervention later in addition to 
the possibility that Qadhaffi would return to his nuclear program and support for 
terrorism.
157
  
 The fear of genocide in Libya framed the discussion within the U.N. Security 
Council on Libya.  The U.N. Security Resolution 1973 demanded an immediate ceasefire 
and authorized the international community to establish a no-fly zone across Libya, 
including the authority to use all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect 
civilians.158  Princeton University law professor Asli Bali explains that from a legal 
perspective, the Libyan intervention is unprecedented as it’s the first Security Council-
authorized humanitarian (military) intervention.
159
  Appearing on Democracy Now 
(2011), Bali agreed that some sort of military intervention should have taken place, 
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however direct political engagement with the Libyan government should have 
occurred.
160
  The binary way (intervene or not) in which the options towards the Libyan 
Regime are framed was very problematic.
161
  Moreover, the considerations by the 
coalition concerning its will to intervene in Libya are based on the isolation of the 
regime, its weak military, its possibility of migration flows to Europe and its potential to 
destabilize energy markets are clearly among the motivations to engage in the Libyan 
conflict.
162
  Bali also contends that the Libya does not equate with a casual relationship to 
the use of force by the regimes in Yemen or Bahrain, these developments are occurring 
simultaneously and the coalition forces are supporting both the Bahraini and Yemeni 
regimes’ and that in itself is a troubling intervention of its own in the context of the Arab 
Spring uprisings.
163
 
 Although it is acknowledged that a humanitarian consideration did compel the 
intervention; critics, however, argue that the underlining interests of the U.S. and other 
collaborating countries must be questioned.  It might seem ironic that certain western 
countries turned against Qadhaffi, yet these countries understand that they have more to 
gain from a new regime in Libya.  Three key factors that helped determine the 
intervention are arms, energy and refugees.  The U.S. and Western Europe have interests 
in arms deals to the new Libyan government, The Transitional National Council (NTC), 
its access to Libya’s natural gas and crude oil in addition to preventing the Libyan and 
Tunisian refugees to the European Union.
164
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French President Nicolas Sarkozy pressed the case for intervention in Libya.  
Some argue that   As previously discussed in Chapter 2, Libya’s problematic relationship 
with France was a key determinant of its tough stance against the Libyan government. 
interest in border control and access to Libyan oil is key to Sarkozy’s incentives.  The 
E.U. has great interest in North Africa and Turkey since they are viewed as a threat to its 
social and political stability.
165
  Conflict in Africa leads to massive illegal migrations to 
the E.U. and the fall of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali along with the armed 
revolt against Qadhaffi resulted in 41,000 refugees at the Italian Island of Lampedusa by 
June 2011.
166
  Therefore, both France and British Prime Minister David Cameron had 
their national interests and the overall interest of the E.U. fueling their decision on 
intervention.  
These national (domestic and E.U. level) interests, among those of the U.S. were 
also tied to Libyan oil.  France and Britain, like the U.S. did not want any disturbance to 
the world oil industry.  And as noted earlier, Libyan oil is in high demand since its crude 
oil is cheaper to refine and cheaper to transport to the West since it does not have to 
travel through the Arabian/Persian Gulf.  Oil exploration had begun in the 1940s in Libya 
and it is still believed that much of Libya’s oil reserve has not been tapped, therefore a 
priority for numerous oil companies.  American oil companies had lobbied Congress in 
order to return to Libya since they were forced to leave in the 1986 by the Reagan 
Administration.  Qadhaffi was known to irritate oil companies by raising fees and taxes 
along with other demands therefore, it was in the interest of both the E.U. and U.S. to 
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foster close ties with a new Libyan government.  The countries that supported the Libyan 
rebels did so with the goal of repayment by priority in oil rights, concessions and overall 
business relations with the new Libyan government.     
The appearance of the entire Arab World’s support was critical for the 
intervention in Libya.  The Arab League is a notoriously fragmented organization in 
which numerous of its twenty-two member states either boycotts meetings or vote due to 
political differences.  Nevertheless, support for an intervention in Libya was obtained 
from member states of the GCC (specifically Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.).  
Although, these states represent a very small percentage of the Arab World, they were 
key players in aiding in the intervention and ensuring that the rebels were successful.  
These monarchies fear for their survival and as previously mentioned, the history of 
personal antagonism between Qadhaffi and the Saudi King was a key factor in the Saudi 
support for intervening in Libya.  
Qatar was also instrumental in the Arab League’s effort to urge the U.N. to 
establish a no-fly zone in Libya and to a large extent it funded the revolution with 
massive amounts of money, weapons, supplies and training.  Qatar’s military joined the 
NATO campaign and sent six Mirage fighter jets to Libya.
167
  The benefit of the GCC 
support was twofold:  it allowed for a Western interference in the Arab World with less 
political recourse while it presented the Gulf states as supporting pro-humanitarian and 
pro-democracy in Libya, while they simultaneously cracked down on protestors within 
their borders and in the case of Saudi Arabia and U.A.E., in Bahrain with support of the 
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U.S.  These international alliances were instrumental in determining the fate of the 
Libyan civil war and the subsequent uprisings in the Arab World.  The interests of the 
GCC countries and their regional aspirations are key to understanding their support for 
the intervention in Libya as a basis for the counter-revolution.  From the very beginning 
of the conflict, Qatar provided arms and training to the rebels and aided in securing 
massive amount of funding to the NTC.
168
 
 The rebellion in Libya, over time might have succeeded in the downfall of the 
regime, however the conflict would have led to an increased destabilization in the region 
and increased immigration to the European Union.  Therefore, a quick resolution to the 
conflict was a priority for the European Union members of NATO and the U.S., both for 
strategic and humanitarian reasons.  The military answer to the civil unrest in Libya via 
the U.N. and NATO. began with a no-fly zone over Libya.  The subsequent U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) gave authorization for further efforts to 
destabilize the Libyan government by not ruling out any means of protecting Libyan 
civilians.
169
   On February, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1970.  It targeted 
financial and travel sanctions on Qadhaffi, his family, key Libyan officials in the retime 
and imposed an arms embargo on Libya.
170
  
 The cultivation of popular opinion for the international military intervention in 
Libya created specifically by Al-Jazeera’s media coverage amid the international 
community permitted the Libyan conflict to represent the advancement of not only Libya, 
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but of the democratic state in the Arab World.  However, behind the scenes, a very 
different outcome, orchestrated by powerful states and international alliances would 
prevail.  
 On March 29
th
, 2011, French warplanes began the air attack on the Libyan 
government.  The coalition of French, British and U.S. warplanes followed and targeted 
the Libyan government with strikes intended to take out Qadhaffi’s air defense system.  
U.S. warships also surrounded Libya and fired cruise missiles on various targets.  At the 
end of March, the coalition transferred the mission to NATO.  NATO was responsible for 
the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the arms embargo against Libya.  As NATO air 
power aided the rebels with the balance of power against the regime, it was not sufficient 
for the rebels to take over Tripoli.  Battles over cities ensued and this bloody stalemate 
continued until in mid-May, NATO air strikes aided the rebels in securing the 
strategically important coastal city of Misarata.  Tripoli fell to the rebels on August 21, 
several months after the fighting first started.  Finally, in October 17
th
, the cities of Sirte 
and Bani, both regime strongholds of the regime Walid fell.  Sirte ended up being where 
Qadhaffi was found.  Oct. 20
th, Qadhaffi’s 40-car convoy was hit by NATO airstrikes and 
resulted the rebel’s capture and execution of Libyan leader.  
 After months of fighting, the NATO mission had achieved its objective.  
However, it is important to scrutinize the U.S. and international community’s compliancy 
in stalling the Libyan revolution.  The renewed relations with Libya made the revolution 
(long in the making) even more difficult as it normalized relations with Qahdaffi and 
accepted the authoritarian regime back into the international community allowing 
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corporate and national security interests to trump the interests of Libyans.
171
   Therefore, 
it is important to note that the U.S. and the Western European countries (namely Britain 
and France) were forced to change their relations with the Libyan government when the 
reality on the ground changed in February 2011, therefore, Libya is not a foreign policy 
success for the U.S.
172
  The U.S. stalled the progress of the impending revolution in 
Libya by restoring ties with the Libyan government,.
173
  The renewed relations with 
Libya did indeed bolster the authoritarian regime and allowed the Libyan government to 
further oppress dissidents and stall democratic reform.  However, when conditions on the 
ground changed in Libya and the uprising kept growing, it was evident that the U.S. 
government needed to take a side.  The U.S. supported military intervention was driven 
by strategic and moral considerations, and thus over-determined.  The Libyan 
government’s infamous and unreliable history and its marginalization from other Arab 
states allowed the U.S. to quickly abandon its former ally and plan for regime change 
with the European and Arab states. 
   
The Counter-Revolution  
Libya was part of a larger revolution stalled in the MENA region.  The 
intervention in Libya prompted many questions and anger in terms of the fundamental 
justification for intervening in Libya.  It also raised inquiries and resentment about the 
intervention in relation to the violence in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen.  As previously 
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discussed, Libya was an overall easy country for the West and GCC states to intervene in 
for various reasons.  Bahrain, Syria and Yemen are all unique cases that entail different 
outcomes in terms of U.S. foreign policy and the international response.  Before briefly 
discussing each case, an understanding of the important historical political struggles in 
the MENA region is helpful in understanding the contemporary politics that affected the 
U.S. and international community’s responses to the violence in Bahrain, Syria and 
Yemen.  
The inter-Arab relations of the 1950s-1960s were dominated by the power 
struggles between “revolutionary” republics, led by pan-Arab nationalist military 
officers, of which Libya belonged, and the more conservative or reactionary 
monarchies.
174
  While countries such as Libya attempted various failed pan-Arab 
unification projects, the revolutionary republics and the conservative monarchies waged 
proxy wars in civil conflicts in other states such as Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan.
175
  The 
power struggles, ideological and identity conflicts including the waging of proxy wars 
exist today in the inter-Arab relations, however the main difference is that the 
revolutionary republics became authoritarian states and have experienced national 
revolutions.
176
  Furthermore, the similarity between the global cold war era of the 1950s 
and 1960s and the contemporary Arab cold war is the mobilization of the conservative 
monarchies in their attempt to block further change in the Arab regional system.
177
  The 
mobilization of the conservative monarchies and the U.S. was key to the counter-
revolution.      
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The Arab uprisings of 2011-2012 deepened divisions of the Arab cold war, of 
which include sectarian lines (Sunni-Shi’a).178  Moreover, as Cairo and Damascus dealt 
with uprisings, and Baghdad endured the U.S. occupation, the GCC countries, 
(specifically Qatar) rose to be the most active force in regional politics.
179
  As previously 
discussed, Qatar played a key role in the Libyan conflict with its supported the Libyan 
rebels.  Qatar, home to largest U.S. military base in the region U.S. Central Command, 
demonstrated its regional power aspirations and ability to impact the outcomes of the 
Arab Spring uprisings.  Qatar’s rise to power impacted the uprisings in Libya, Bahrain, 
Syria and Yemen, as no countervailing force to challenge the conservative monarchies 
existed.
180
   
As a result of the veto of the Arab League proposal in the Security Council 
concerning an international military intervention in Syria, it is argued that the Syrian 
conflict will become more violent with arms coming in to support both the Assad Regime 
and the Syrian resistance groups.
181
  The GCC’s call for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
to leave are not in favor with the democratization of Syria, but in hopes of a successor 
Regime that is predominately Sunni and eager for closer ties with Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and allies.
182
   
 Therefore, the intervention in Libya was not only ‘safe’ but it lacked 
Washington’s true support for democratic reform in the Arab world.  From the evidence, 
it would seem that the Libyan intervention was not meant to make an example for other 
Arab dictators and that it was not a coincidence that the same day the U.N. passed its 
                                                        
178
 Ibid.  
179
 Ibid.  
180
 Ibid.  
181
 Ibid.  
182
 Ibid.  
 57 
resolution on Libya, Saudi forces were sent to stop pro-democracy protestors in 
Bahrain.
183
  Bahrain’s proximity to the U.S. Fifth Fleet is the rationale behind the Saudi 
troops crackdown on democratic protestors during the Arab Spring.   
In mid February, when the Bahraini ruling family feared it was losing grip over 
the country, it sought the GCC for help.  Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Qatar sent in 
thousands of reinforcements (soldiers and police) into Bahrain to restore order and bolster 
the Bahraini ruling family.  Therefore, there was a military intervention in Bahrain, 
supported by the U.S. and carried out by the three GCC countries, however this 
intervention was to stabilize the regime.  Afterwards, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa 
imposed a three-month ‘state of national safety’ while Bahraini security forces began a 
systematic attack on demonstrators around the Kingdom.
184
  The intervention was carried 
out primarily due to the fact that Bahrain is a critical American ally in the region and 
home to an important military base, the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet.185  Therefore, in order to 
safeguard American strategic interests in the Arabian Gulf, Washington is essentially 
undermining the prospects for Bahraini democracy.  Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Qatar 
are also worried about instability in their neighboring countries and therefore have their 
strategic and national security interests in mind.   
 The Yemeni government has also cracked down on its Arab Spring-inspired 
democratic protestors.  However, Washington’s main concern in Yemen is its ties with al 
Qaeda.  U.S.-armed Special Forces protect Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh and 
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U.S. trained Yemeni forces have been used by the Saleh government against opposition-
affiliated tribal leaders in the capital of Sana’a.186  The U.S. involvement in Yemen is 
driven solely by counter-terrorism and has nothing to do with promoting democracy as is 
true for the entire MENA region.  
 Some observers, such as Vijay Prashad assert that the Libyan rebellion was 
‘hijacked’ in early March of 2011 by the Atlantic Powers (Britian, France, Germany and 
the U.S.) in addition to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in an effort to counter the threat to U.S. 
security and Saudi rule.
187
  The intervention in Libya allowed for the counter-revolution, 
or in other words, the maintenance of the status quo in the Arab World, specifically 
pertaining to the Atlantic States access to oil in addition to the stability of Israel, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf emirs.
188
  Moreover, the pressure that the Saudi Government and 
other Gulf Arabs put on the U.S. in particular for an intervention as they were faced with 
the uprisings in both Bahrain and Yemen is critical.
189
  Direct western military 
intervention occurred in Libya because it was neither prevented nor restrained by security 
factors or strategic alliances, nor did it risk damaging western-Arab relations, all of which 
Bahrain and Syria represent.
190
   
Yemen’s Arab Spring experience is also unique.  President Saleh’s lack of 
legitimacy is compounded with those of the historic north-south Yemen divide including 
the U.S. military presence supporting the war on terror.  The Yemeni government, like 
the Libyan government also cracked down on the uprisings that occurred during the Arab 
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Spring, however, similarly, in the case of Bahrain, the U.S. is supporting the government.  
Washington’s main concern in Yemen is its ties with al Qaeda, therefore resulting in U.S. 
support for Yemeni President Abdallah Saleh.  U.S.-armed Special Forces protect Saleh 
and U.S. trained Yemeni forces have been used by the Saleh government against 
opposition-affiliated tribal leaders in the capital of Sana’a.191  The U.S. involvement in 
Yemen is driven by counter-terrorism, which trumps the promotion of democracy.  Saudi 
Arabia’s main concern in Yemen is border security.   
 Other critics such as Noam Chomsky, contend that the need to protect the supply 
of oil provides guidance for western reactions to the Arab World’s democracy 
uprising.
192
  This provides a framework for understanding all of the events of the counter-
revolution, one which supports a neo-Gramscian critique of the neo-liberal project.  This 
argument is most obvious in the U.S.-Saudi supported crackdown on democracy protests 
in Bahrain and the U.S.-U.N. intervention in Libya.  An oil rich dictator who proves to be 
a reliable client is secure, but an unreliable client such as Qadhaffi is not preferable.
193
  
Consequently, the argument is that the NATO intervention in Libya reflects a broader 
effort by the West to seek control, or at least dependable clients in the Middle East, and 
in the case of Libya, access to large untapped areas presumed to be rich with oil.
194
  The 
promise of more oil discovery in Libya was certainly an added benefit of regime change 
for all states that participated.  It is clear that the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya was 
the result of more than one determining factor; rather a persuasive case was made on both 
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humanitarian and strategic considerations.  Moreover, Libya historically has always been 
an exception for U.S. foreign policy and an easy target for U.S. aggression.   
 The intervention occurred as a result of Libya’s persistent vulnerability in the 
New World Order.  Its isolation within the Arab World, and absence of genuine allies 
meant there was no real political risk for the U.S., U.N. or NATO intervention.  Libya 
proved to be an opportune moment for Washington to appear as a defender of human 
rights and democracy in the Arab World without great political risk associated with 
meddling in the region.  In addition, the U.S. became a key player in the role of 
rebuilding the Libyan state and economy as well as the Gulf states.  Furthermore, as 
Human Rights Watch documents the growing violence and deaths in Syria, the swift 
intervention in Libya further illustrates Libya as an exception in U.S. foreign policy 
towards the Arab Spring, and an overall international network of countries seeking the 
maintenance of monarchies and authoritarian regimes in the MENA.  
 
Post-Qadhaffi Violence in Libya 
Two significant aspects of the Arab World’s response to the state led violence in 
Libya were that for the first time in the history of the modern Middle East, Arab regimes 
and the majority of the Arab people agreed that Arab leaders should not be protected by 
state sovereignty when committing atrocities against their people.
195
  However, the 
difficulties and violence remain for Libya.  Since the NATO mission ceased, the new 
Libyan transitional government, the NTC recognized by the West is not in control of the 
country; instead hundreds of separate militias roam Libya.
196
  Therefore, the violence in 
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Libya did not end with the end of NATO’s military campaign.  In the aftermath of 
violence from the war and Qadhaffi’s murder, the Libyan society was faced with difficult 
tasks such as healing the society after war, beginning to build a civil society in addition to 
promoting democratic institutions.  In order to achieve these goals, Libya’s main 
challenge is nation-building, which requires national identity construction and the 
creation of a public administration.
197
  These tasks were sidelined, as security was still a 
great concern for Libyans.  Although the Libyan interim government, the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) was quickly recognized internationally, in Libya, their 
legitimacy as a transitional government has not coincided with the international 
acceptance.  For the majority of Libyans, this lack of legitimacy is derived from the fact 
that defectors from Qadhaffi’s regime were key figures in the formation of both the NTC 
and rebel national army.  Therefore, suspicion of the old order prevails.  Regional 
dynamics in addition to the agenda of Islamists and secularists have created a sensitive 
dynamic in the country.  Suspicion and the massive influx of weapons into the country 
have created a volatile environment.  NATO and Qatar ignored the UNSC resolution’s 
arms embargo and supplied weapons, training and tactical instructions to the rebels.
198
   
Some questioned the credibility of NATO’s Operation ‘Unified Protector.’  As 
Claudia Gazzini argued, the complex political environment that ensued in Libya 
following the intervention has bred an enormous amount of bloodshed.  Even though 
NATO’s operation was marketed as a humanitarian operation, the death toll after 
NATO’s involvement was at least ten times greater than the death toll reported during the 
                                                        
197
 Anderson. 2011.‘Demystifying the Arab Spring’  
198
 Toensing. 2012.  
 62 
first few weeks of the uprising, therefore exacerbating the violence.
199
   The exacerbated 
violence was also bolstered by the fact that the Libyan rebels constituted a network of 
independent militias, these groups continued to operate independently within Libya.  As 
diverse armed militias were controlling separate areas of Libya, uncertainty and mistrust 
continued to prevail.  
 Alternatively, it can be argued that Qadhaffi’s legacy of lawlessness and mistrust 
in Libya will be difficult to overcome as four decades of unpredictable cruelty resulted in 
various scores left to be settled in Libya; informers to be exposed and revenge.
200
  The 
majority of the mistrust and appetite for revenge was based on the brutal repression of 
any regime opposition via a network of intelligence agencies including the Internal 
Security Agency (Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Dhakhli), the External Security Agency (Jihaz Al-
Amn Al-Kharaji), the Military Intelligence Service (Jihaz Al-Amn Al-Askari or 
Istikhbarat), the Revolutionary Committees (Al-Lijan Al-Thawria), Revolutionary Guard 
(Al-Haras Al-Thawri) and informants, who acted with complete impunity and were above 
the law. 201  
 As a result of this atmosphere, Libya’s current environment is not promising for 
any government, much less democracy.
202
  The multitude of problems that would 
entangle Libyan society after Qadhaffi will not be solved in a short time-frame as the 
Libyans are basically building their state from scratch.  The regime prevented the 
development of stable institutions, civil society and economic associations that led to 
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widespread corruption, decades of cruelty and suspicion.
203
  The violence that occurred 
after Qadhaffi’s death was the result of numerous conditions; the arbitrary cruelty 
cultivated by the Libyan government, its oppression of opposition and its practice of 
nepotism.  This violence was heightened by an unorganized (in terms of a lack of civil 
society) and fragmented society (regional and tribal).  Political alliances, networks of 
economic associations, or national organizations of any kind are banned in Libya.
204
 
Libyan society has been fractured by the mistrust in its government, resulting in every 
national institution, including the military, is divided by kinship and region.
205
  Coupled 
with the massive arms flowing into the country, the situation was increasingly volatile.  
 When security is reinstated in Libya, its lack of social and governmental unity 
will impede its democratization and the international isolation resulted in the generation 
in its 30s and 40s unprepared to manage the country.
206
  Libyans will continue to mistrust 
the political process until a more legitimate governing body and national institutions are 
developed, specifically in defense, policing and vital service delivery.
207
  An early sign of 
the inability of the NTC to govern Libya was its failure to force the Misratans to hand the 
bodies of both Qaddafi and son Moatassim in addition to their killers.
208
  The struggle to 
disarm the militias across Libya, which brought down the regime, will be a difficult yet 
important step in securing the country and moving on.  In addition to Libya’s obstacles of 
stability and democratization, those who rise to power in the post-Qadhaffi era will have 
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done so based on opportunism rather than popular legitimacy.
209
  However, the Arab 
Spring has proven that democracy will in fact merge in Libya and the Middle East.  The 
transition is just a matter of time.   
  
CHAPTER 5  
 
Conclusion  
  
The main research question of this study is ‘why was Libya a target for U.S. 
military intervention in the Arab Spring?’  In order to answer this question, I have 
examined the incentives for both Libya and the U.S. to normalize relations in addition to 
the impact that 9/11 and the 2011 Arab Spring had on U.S.-Libya relations.  In addition, I 
studied why the U.S. supported the Libyan rebels in the 2011 civil war rather than the 
Libyan government, a recent U.S. ally.  This examination led to inquire on the internal 
dynamics of the Libyan state, a brief overview of historic and contemporary U.S.-Libya 
relations and an examination of the causes for the E.U. and GCC member states’ support 
for the Libyan rebels.  
Incorporating themes from Neorealism, liberal interventionalism and neo-
Gramscian analysis allowed for a broader understanding of Libya’s vulnerable position in 
the international state system, foreign policy rationale for military intervention in Libya 
as well as insight on Libya’s relations with powerful states and the institutions they 
created and control in order to protect their interests.  Libya’s vulnerability in the 
international system resulted in its aggressive reformist policies following the 1969 coup 
that were meant to spread Libyan influence and strengthen its international prestige.  The 
Libyan government used its oil wealth to support a nationalist revolution within its 
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borders and attempted to export this revolution by supporting groups fighting the status 
quo powers all over the world. These policies, the support for international terrorist 
networks and its nuclear weapons program made it a focus of harsh U.S. foreign policy.  
The Libyan government’s history of antagonizing and embarrassing leaders and civilians 
from the U.S., Britain, France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar resulted in its demise.  The Libyan 
state’s violent reaction to its Arab Spring uprising resulted in international intervention in 
support of anti-government forces.  
The liberal internationalist foreign agenda based on humanitarian rationale 
warranted the necessary military, political and economic support for regime change in 
Libya.  This agenda was cultivated and carried out in order to ensure that another 
government did not commit mass killings while the international community failed to 
respond.  This agenda was also carried out by the states that had the power to intervene 
with the international legal framework in which they drive and manipulate in the U.N., 
NATO and the ICC
210
.  The neo-Gramscian IR perspective incorporated in this study 
emphasizes how those who chose to defy the rules of the dominant capitalist elites (ie. 
‘rogue states’) and act in the interests of the both their state and citizens are punished 
with sanctions, international isolation or military force.  Libya has endured all of three 
punishments, directly from the U.S. Congress and through Washington’s powerful 
transnational financial and political relationships, resulting in international alliances and 
organizations that were used to manipulate Libya into following the imposed norms of 
international neoliberal system or suffer the consequences.   
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This study took an in-depth look at both the domestic and international constraints 
facing the Libyan government as it sought rapprochement with the U.S.  In light of the 
other key states supporting the intervention, the U.S.-Libya relationship provided an 
important window to the many mechanisms used by the global hegemonic government 
and its influence over international organizations in order to pressure weaker states to 
follow their rules and the harsh prices they pay if they refuse.  The Libyan government 
that came to power in the 1969 coup, was steadfast in their disapproval of the 
international system and the neocolonial influence that the Third World countries were 
subjected to.  The Libyan government’s belief in the illegitimacy of the international 
system led to its support and training of numerous ‘terrorists/freedom fighters’ of which 
harassed numerous states around the world.  
Over the course of 42 years, the Libyan government had alienated itself within its 
own borders as well as in the international community through its anti-West and anti-
Gulf monarchy rhetoric and policies.  The U.S.-Libya rapprochement was primarily 
driven by economic incentives as well as the Libyan regime’s desire to maintain power.  
It was no surprise then that Qadhaffi, after a decade of normalization efforts and 
acquiescing to U.S. demands, was quickly cast aside.  Even after ‘making peace’ with the 
West, Qadhaffi became a political liability for the U.S. as a result of its extreme use of 
state violence in the early days of its 2011 protests/uprising.  Abandoning Qadhaffi’s 
government not only allowed the U.S. to aid in preventing the possibility of increased 
bloodshed, it also allowed the U.S. to potentially be viewed in a more positive light in the 
Arab World as a result of its support in the demise of the Qadhaffi’s regime.  
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 The U.S. support for an international military intervention in Libya was driven by 
U.S. interest, yet ultimately was influenced by a larger agenda.  This agenda included 
European states (Britain and France) and Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
U.A.E.) commercial interests regarding Libya’s oil and natural gas reserves.  Britain and 
France’s national interests in relation to Libya and their historic animosities toward the 
Libyan government are key to their support of the international intervention.  The Gulf 
monarchies desire was to target a despised enemy and thwart the momentum of the Arab 
Spring in order to ensure their survival.  
This study demonstrated my initial argument, that the U.S. led-international 
military intervention in Libya was over-determined.  The Obama Administration did have 
a sincere fear about Qadhaffi’s forces attempting to commit genocide in Benghazi and 
other eastern Libyan cities.  This humanitarian focus served as a pretext for U.S. support 
of a military intervention.  The Libyan government’s political alienation, even within the 
Arab World, along with Qadhaffi’s unpredictable nature made Libya an easy target for an 
international military intervention by the powerful NATO members and the GCC 
countries during the Arab Spring.  The fact that Libya is strategically located in North 
Africa and has abundant untapped oil and natural gas reserves only made it more 
attractive to key players in the intervention.  The American oil firms will have lucrative 
futures in Libya, as they were awarded numerous oil and natural gas concessions.  
As demonstrated in this study, Libya proved to be a unique case study since its 
uprising was half peaceful, half armed rebellion and resulted in an attempt at succession 
or multiple successions from a failed states.  It was also unique in the fact the 42-year-old 
‘revolutionary period’ left its society and economy deeply fractured and isolated from the 
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international world.  Qadhaffi, the nationalist revolutionary was fearful of a true 
revolution and attempted to ensure his regime’s future by alliances with powerful 
states.
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  The Libyan government failed at disrupting the status quo, therefore, it was 
forced to integrate into the very system it loathed.   
While the Arab Spring demonstrated the MENA region citizen’s symbolic 
rejection of authoritarian rule, it also revealed inconsistent U.S. foreign policy toward the 
uprisings and questions the sincerity of its rhetoric on democratic reform in the Arab 
World.  The Obama Administration supported the uprisings in North Africa while calling 
for democratic reform and even out-right military intervention as in the case of Libya.   
 All three IR paradigms, realist, liberal internationalist and neo-Gramscian provide 
insight on why the Obama Administration abandoned Qadhaffi’s regime and supported 
the intervention.  In realist terms, The Obama Administration needed to take a calculated 
move.  It would have been extremely unpopular to allow Libyan state forces to crush the 
uprising or the armed rebellion.  Especially considering the anti-Americanism in the 
region as a result of past U.S. foreign policy as well as the unpopular wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Perhaps the Obama administration and other key leaders in the intervention 
also assumed that the new Libyan government would prove to be a more reliable ally 
who is more sympathetic to Western and Gulf Arab economic interests and influence.  
 Liberal internationalists champion for international norms and the moral 
obligation to limit the ability of a state leader to unleash extreme violence on its 
populace.  The Obama Administration took this responsibility seriously.  Key officials 
and presidential advisors were keen to argue for the necessity of an intervention.     
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 Kawczynski p. 166. As cited in Fisk, Robert. ‘Gaddafi Vows to Expel a Million’ in The Independent. 
October 19, 1995.  
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 A Neo-Gramscian perspective takes into account the transnational alliances, 
international financial and legal institutions the U.S. had influenced greatly in terms of 
the building support for an intervention in Libya.  The U.S. relations with key E.U. and 
the Arab League members solidified the political and financial support for the military 
intervention.  The U.N. aided in freezing billions of dollars of Libyan assets abroad and 
restricted travel for Qadhaffi, his family and inner circle.  The U.N. also provided the 
legality for intervention with the UNSCR 1973.  These alliances and institutions, in 
Gramscian terms, were ‘tools of U.S. hegemony’ and aided in sustaining the status quo in 
the Arab Gulf.       
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration supported counter-revolutions elsewhere.  
The international military intervention in Libya coincided with the counter-revolution led 
by the Saudi government in Bahrain (aided by the U.A.E.) alongside the U.S. in Yemen 
in order to maintain the traditional power dynamics in the Arab World.  Therefore, 
although, the U.S. did support the anti-government forces in Libya, its commitment to 
bolstering true democratic reform in Libya is questionable at the least.  Yet, war, and the 
rebuilding of countries after warfare is big business and the U.S. will be greatly involved 
in the reinvigoration of Libya’s economy with its exploration, technology and 
infrastructure updates in Libya’s oil and natural gas sectors.   
 The U.S. involvement in the reconstruction of Libya won’t be without its 
problems.  The initial gratefulness shared by Libyans who supported the NATO 
intervention, will fade as distrust of the U.S. political and economic influence over the 
NTC and Libyan future governments will highlight the deep mistrust of American 
intervention in Libya and the Middle East in general.  This is especially true as Libyans 
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understand that their experience in the Arab Spring was unique in terms of the 
international support for the anti-government forces.  Moreover, the U.S. did not support 
the intervention for democratic reform, rather, Libya served as a buffer zone between the 
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the halted revolutions in Syria and the Arab Gulf.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
Bibliography 
 
Abrams, Elliot. 2011. ‘U.S. Military Intervention for Libya?’ Council of Foreign 
Relations Website. Retrieved May 24, 2012 from http://www.cfr.org/libya/us-
military-intervention-libya/p24362 
 
Albrecht, H., Schlumberger, O.  2004. ‘Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without 
Democratization in the Middle East’ in International Political Science Review 25, 
no. 4, pp. 371-392 
 
Aliboni, Roberto. 2011. ‘A Confused Western Intervention’ in Bitterlemons. Ed. 17 Vol. 
9, June 16.  Retrieved January 10, 2011 from http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?year=2011 
 
Alterman, John B. 2006. ‘Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case’ in Middle East 
Quarterly (Winter) p. 22-29. Retrieved December 12, 2009 from   
 http://www.meforum.org/886/libya-and-the-us-the-unique-libyan-case 
 
Al-Werfalli, Mabroka. 2011. Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens’ Political 
 Attitude and Behaviour.  Ithaca: Ithaca Press.  
 
Anderson, Lisa.  2011. ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring’ in Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 
December 10, 2011 from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/collections/foreign-affairs-coverage-of-
the-crisis-in-the-middle-east 
  
Anderson, Lisa. 1982. ‘Libya and American Foreign Policy’ Middle East Journal, Vol. 
36. No. 4 (Autumn).  
 
Anderson, Lisa. 1986. ‘Religion and State in Libya:  The Politics of Identity’ in Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 483, Religion and 
State:  The Struggle for Legitimacy and Power (Jan.). pp. 61-72. 
 
Anderson, Lisa. 1986. ‘Qadhdhafi and His Opposition’ in Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, 
No. 2 (Spring) pp. 225-237.  
 
Anderson, Lisa. 1990. ‘Tribe and State:  Libyan Anomalies’ in Tribes and State 
Formation in the Middle East. Edited by Philip S. Khoury & Joseph Kostiner. 
Berkely and Los Angeles, University of California Press. pp. 288-302.  
 
Anderson, Lisa. 2006. ‘Rogue Libya’s Long Road’ in Middle East Report 241, Iran: 
Looking Ahead. (Winter). 
  
 
 72 
Anderson, Lisa. 2011. ‘Scores to Settle’ in New York Times, Opinion Pages. Retrieved 
September 1, 2011 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/23/libya-after-qaddafi/in-libya-
after-qaddafi-scores-to-settle  
  
Bali, Asli, interview by Amy Goodman, Wednesday, March 23, 2011, ‘Debating 
Intervention: Is U.S.-Led Military Action the Best Solution to Libya Crisis?’ 
Democracy Now. Retrieved March 24, 2011 from 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/3/23/debating_intervention_is_us_led_milita
ry 
 
Bali, Asli. 2011.  ‘Intervention Interrogated’ in Bitterlemons. Ed. 17 Vol. 9 - June 16.  
Retrieved January 10, 2011 from http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?year=2011 
 
Blitz, James and Saigol, Lisa. ‘Libya: No Line in the Sand’ in Financial Times, February 
25,
 
2011. Retrieved November 10, 2012 from 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/198e48b4-411a-11e0-bf62-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DMK4AD59 
 
Booth, Ken.  2007. Theory of World Security. New York:  Cambridge Press. 
 
Bowen, Wyn Q. 2007. Libya and Nuclear Proliferation.  New York:  Routledge.  
 
Browing, N., Fielding-Smith, Abigail & Khalaf, Roula. 2011. ‘Yemen Deploys US-
Trained Special Forces’ in Financial Times. Retrieved January 10 from 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f6cf516-8d0d-11e0-815d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1jZqEeUmh 
 
Chomsky, Noam. 2011. ‘Libya and the World of Oil’ Truth-Out.Org Website.  Retrieved 
November 4, 2011 from http://truthout.org/libya-and-world-oil/1301900400 
 
Cooper, Helene & Myers, Steven Lee. 2011. ‘Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After 
Shift by Clinton’ New York Times. Retrieved December 18, 2011 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19policy.html?pagewanted=all 
 
Cox, Robert W. 1981. ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory’, in Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2.  
Dahi, Omar S. 2011. ‘Understanding the Political Economy of the Arab Revolts’ in 
Middle East Report, 259.  
 
Deeb, Mary Jane. 1999. ‘Political and Economic Developments in Libya in the 1990s’ in 
North Africa in Transition:  State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 
1990s. Edited by Yahia H. Zoubir.  Gainesville:  University Press of Florida. 
 
Editorial 2011. ‘Of Principle and Peril’ in Middle East Report, 258 (Spring). 
 73 
Elliot, Michael. 2011. ‘Viewpoint:  How Libya Became a French and British War’, Time 
online. Retrieved December 10, 2011 from 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060412,00.html 
 
Farha, Ghannam. 1997. ‘Relocation and the Use of Urban Space in Cairo’ in Middle East 
Report, Vol. 27. (Spring). 
 
Feldman, Greg. 2011. ‘Europe’s Border Control with a Humanitarian Face’ in Middle 
East Report, 261 (Winter).  
 
Fly, Jamie M. 2011. ‘Libya is a Problem From Hell’ in Foreign Policy. Retrieved January 
16, from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/16/libya_is_a_problem_from_hell
?page=0,1 
 
Gazzini, Claudia. 2011.  ‘Was the Libya Intervention Necessary?’ in Middle East Report, 
261 (Winter). 
 
Griffiths, M., Roach, S.C. & Solomon, M.S. 2009. Fifty Key Thinkers in International 
Relations. (2nd. ed.) New York:  Routledge. 
 
Henry, Clement & Springborg, Robert. 2010. The Politics of Globalization in the MENA. 
New York:  Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1995. ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’ in Foreign Policy. No. 
98. (Spring), pp. 159-177. 
 
Hossein-zadeh, Ismael. 2009. “The Political Economy of US Wars of Choice: Are they 
Really  Oil Wars?” in Perspectives on Global Development and Technology. Vol. 
8, Issue 2.  
 
Human Rights Watch. 2011. “By All Means Necessary!’ Individual and Command 
Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria” (New York, December)  
 
Hurd, Ian. 2005. ‘The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and The UN 
Sanctions 1992-2003’ in International Organization. Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer) pp.   
495-526.  
 
International Crisis Group. 2011. ‘Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East 
(III):  The Bahrain Revolt. (Brussels, April). 
 
International Crisis Group. 2011.  Holding Libya Together:  Security Challenges After Qaddafi. 
(Tripoli/Brussels, December). 
 
Kaplan, Eben. 2007. ‘How Libya Got Off the List’ Council on Foreign Relations 
website.  Retrieved April 26, 2010 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/10855/#p1  
 74 
Kawczynski. Daniel. 2010. Seeking Gaddafi. London:  Dialogue. 
  
Laufer, Michael. ‘A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology’ Carnegie Endowment for International 
 Peace. Retrieved April 26, 2010 from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/nppli
 bya, Khan_Chronology.pdf  
 
Lynch, Marc. 2002. ‘Using and Abusing the UN, Redux’. In Middle East Report, 225 
(Winter). 
 
Lynch, Marc. 2012. The Arab Uprising. New York:  Public Affairs. 
  
Mattar, Hisham, interview by Charlie Rose. October 20, 2011. “Analysis on Libya after 
Gaddafi with David Ignatius of 'The Washington Post,' author Hisham Matar and 
Lisa Anderson, President of the American University in Cairo” Charlie Rose. 
Retrieved October 30, 2011 from www.charlierose.com/view/content/11956 
 
Muttawa, Khalid, interview by Amy Goodman, Wednesday, March 23, 2011, ‘Debating 
Intervention: Is U.S.-Led Military Action the Best Solution to Libya Crisis?’ 
Democracy Now. Retrieved March 24, 2011 from 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/3/23/debating_intervention_is_us_led_milita
ry 
 
Otman, Waniss & Karlberg, Erling. 2007. The Libyan Economy:  Economic 
Diversification and International Repositioning. Scotland:  Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg.  
 
Otterman, Sharon & Mackey, Robert. ‘Qaddafi Erupts, on Schedule’ in New York Times, 
The Lede. March 30, 2009. Retrieved November 8, 2012 from 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/there-was-no-shortage-of-drama/ 
 
Pargeter, Alison. 2009. ‘Localism and Radicalization in North Africa:  Local Factors and 
the Development of Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya’ in 
International Affairs, Volume 85, No. 5. pp.1031-1044. 
 
Pargeter, Alison. 2012.  Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi. Yale University Press. 
 
Paris, Roland. 1997. ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’ in 
International Security (MIT Press), Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn). 
   
Pollit, Kathy. 2011. ‘The Nation:  News Flash, Women Aren’t All Pacifists’ National 
Public Radio, Partner Content from The Nation. Retrieved December 3, 2012 from 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/23/134788807/the-nation-news-flash-women-arent-
all-pacifists    
 
Prashad, Vijay. 2012.  Arab Spring, Libyan Winter.  Edinburgh:  AK Press. 
 
 75 
Remarks by President Barak Obama in his Address to the Nation on Libya.  March 28, 
2011. National Defense University Washington, D.D. State Department Website.  
Retrieved 9/11/2011 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya 
 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya. United Nations Security 
Council (p. 10). Retrieved May 1, 2012 from 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/.../A_HRC_19_68_en.doc 
 
Robert, David. ‘Behind Qatar’s Intervention in Libya:  Why Was Doha Such A Strong 
Supporter of The Rebels?’ in Foreign Affairs, Features. The Council on Foreign 
Relations. September 28, 2011. Retrieved November 10, 2012 from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68302/david-roberts/behind-qatars-
intervention-in-libya 
 
Ronen, Yehudit. 2002. ‘The Lockerbie Endgame:  Qadhdhafi Slips the Noose’ in Middle 
East Quarterly, Vol. IX: No. 1. (Winter) pp. 53-59.  Retrieved January 28, 2001 
from http://www.meforum.org/138/the-lockerbie-endgame-qadhdhafi-slips-the-
noose  
  
Ryan, Curtis. 2012. ‘The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria’ in Middle East 
Report, 262 (Spring). 
 
Security Council Resolution 31, 21 January 1992; Security Council Resolution 748, 31 
March 1992; and Security Council Resolution 883, 11 November 1993.  Quoted 
in Zoubir, Yahia. 2002. ‘Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rouge State to Good 
Fellow?’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February) p. 35. 
 
Simons, Geoff. 1996. Libya: The Struggle for Survival. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.  
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1995. ‘Liberal International Relations Theory and International 
Economic Law’ in American University International Law Review Vol. 10, no. 2. 
  
St. John, Ronald Bruce. 2002. Libya and the United States:  Two Centuries of Strife. 
Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press  
 
St. John, Ronald Bruce. 2004. ‘Libya is Not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and 
Diplomacy’ in Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer). 
 
St. John, Ronald Bruce. 2008. Libya From Colony to Independence. Oxford: Oneworld 
 Publications.     
  
Sotloff, Steven. 2011. ‘Why the Libyans Have Fallen out of Love with Qatar’ Time 
Magazine. Retrieved January 2, 2012 from 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103409,00.html 
 
 76 
Takeyh, Ray. 1998. ‘Qadhaffi and the Challenge of Militant Islam’ The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3. pp.159-172.   
 
Takeyh, Ray. 2001. ‘The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold’ in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
80, No. 3 (May-June). 
  
Toensing, Chris. 2008. ’Libya’s Fat Cat’ in Middle East Report.  Retrieved February 19, 
2010 from http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped011108.html  
 
Toensing, Chris. 2011. ‘A New Clarity for Washington’ Shared Content from Bitter 
Lemons International in Middle East Report. Retrieved January 10, from 
http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped120111 
 
Toensing, Chris. 2012. ‘Libya’s Lessons’ Shared Content with Institute for Policy Studies 
 in Middle East Report. Retrieved March 7, 2012 from  
 http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped030512 
 
United Nations Security Council’s Press Release on Resolution 1973 (2011) Retrieved 
March 11, 2011 from http:// 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10200.doc.htm 
 
United Nations Security Council’s Resolution (1973). Retrieved April 6, 2011 from 
http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement 
 
United Nations Security Council’s Resolution (1970). Retrieved April 6, 2011 from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%20(2011) 
 
Urbina, Ian. 2003. ‘Sanctions No Longer Serve US Interests’ Shared Content from the 
Los Angeles Times (January), Middle East Report. Retrieved November 3, 2011 
from http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped010103 
 
U.S. Congress Congressional Record. House of Representatives. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996. 104
th
 Cong., 2d sess. 1996. H.R.3107.ENR. Sec. 5. 
  
2011. ‘U.S./U.K.: Documents Reveal Libya Rendition’ Human Rights Watch. September 
9. Retrieved November 21, 2012 from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/08/usuk-documents-reveal-libya-rendition-
details 
 
2004. U.S./U.K. ‘Negotiations with Libya regarding Nonproliferation’ The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 1(January). pp. 195-197. 
 
Vandewalle, Dirk. 1998.  Libya since Independence:  Oil and State Building.  London:  
IB Tauris & Co. Ltd.  
 
 77 
Vandewalle, Dirk. 2006.  A History of Modern Libya. New York:  Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Vandewalle, Dirk (ed).  Libya Since 1969:  Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited.   New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1954.  The Man, The State, and War. New York:  Columbia University 
Press.   
 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics.  Boston:  McGraw Hill.   
 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1986.  ‘Anarchic Orders and Balances of Powers’ in Neorealism and its 
Critics.  Ed. by Robert Keohane.  New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Zoubir, Yahia H. 1999. North Africa in Transition:  State, Society, and Economic 
Transformation in the 1990s. Edited by Yahia H. Zoubir.  Gainesville:  University 
Press of Florida. 
 
Zoubir, Yahia H. 2002. ‘Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rouge State to Good 
Fellow?’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February) pp.31-53.  
 
Zoubir, Yahia. 2006. ‘America Policy in the Maghreb:  The Conquest of a New Region.’ 
Area: Mediterranean & Arab World. WP 13. (July). Retrieved May 15, 2010 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ wps/portalrielcano_engContentWCM_GLOB
AL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ mediterranean+arab+world/dt13-
2006  
 
Zoubir, Yahia H. 2008. “The United States, Islamism, Terrorism and Democracy in the 
Maghreb:  The Predominance of Security” in North Africa:  Politics, Region and 
the Limits of Transformation. Edited by Yahia H. Zoubir,  & Haizam Amirah 
Fernadez.  New York: Routledge. 
 
